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Conflict Resolution in a New Era 
 
Throughout the 1990s the world has seen a rise in the number of armed conflicts. 
The conflicts of the post-Cold War era have turned out to be different from what the 
world had seen in the past one hundred years. The conflicts, termed New Wars, are often 
internal, but not defined by borderlines. The conventional war was fought between two 
relatively equal and clearly defined opponents, whereas the New Wars of today include a 
myriad of parties, causes and interests. Their complexity is striking and only worsened by 
the extent to which banditry is affecting the wars and their prolongation.  
Along with the emergence of the New Wars in the era of globalisation, the awareness 
of the human suffering that the wars caused grew. The world had never seen so many 
interventions by the United Nations as it did during the 1990s. Especially one continent 
was marked by this development; the African. 
During the Cold War, the recently gained independence of many African nations 
turned out to be de jure rather than de facto. The two superpowers turned African states 
into their marionettes, supplying regimes of the right spirit with weapons and finance. 
Once the Cold War was over, the interest for the African continent fell, and the 
individual states, artificially created as the colonial times ended, were left to their own 
devices. The many internal disputes that had been subdued with the support of the 
superpowers soon erupted and turned into armed conflicts, comprising the complexities 
of the New Wars.   
Numerous African states ended up as failed states. Though an administration 
nominally existed, it had no legitimacy and no reach. The state institutions were unable to 
function. This was the case in Liberia, where an uprising against the regime of Samuel 
Doe effectively threw the country into a devastating civil war. In Somalia the state 
collapsed altogether. President Siad Barre was ousted, but the opposition could not agree 
on a leader and a war broke out. The country was tossed into a protracted civil war, 
leaving hundreds of thousands of civilians dead, displaced or forced into fighting.  For 
many years Somalia’s seat in organisations like the UN and the OAU (Organisation of 
African Unity) was left empty, since no one was recognised as the official leader of the 
country, and as such, no official administration existed (Anonymous2002: 251f).  
In this turmoil of shifting leaders and differences among the population groups, the 
attention surrounding the failed states grew. Public pressure and international politics 
forced the international community to intervene in these conflicts. However, the New 
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Wars posed and still poses a real challenge to interventionists, both to major powers like 
the US, as well as to international organisations like the UN.  
It has become apparent that the interventionists were not quite prepared for the 
complexity of the New Wars. The conventional intervention models have fallen short of 
the new targets. The questions remain; what makes these New Wars so difficult to 
intervene in, and what makes them so prolonged and apparently insolvable? What has 
caused the international community so much trouble in bringing the involved parties to 
the negotiation table?  
The paper in hand will examine issues like the influence of the numerous parties and 
warlords that are adding to the difficulties of intervening in the New Wars, especially on 
the African continent, although not unknown to other parts of the world.  
The so-called warlords pose such an issue. They found themselves a niche in the 
African civil conflicts. Starvation, an unruly environment and fear of tomorrow forced 
many to fight for the factions led by these warlords, who preyed upon the members of 
clans and groups, exploiting their security dilemmas in order to keep them loyal. The 
warlords gained power and the possibility of carrying out banditry without interference. 
These criminals are also the de facto leaders of the society, although unrecognised as such. 
How does one cope with such dilemmas? The warlords both cause and control the war. 
If a warlord benefits from the war, how does the interventionists gain acceptance for 
their presence, and how can positive peace1 be achieved? The relationship between greed 
and grievance is evident in this dilemma. 
Furthermore, the complex situations were new to the interventionists. Since the 
previous models of conflict intervention have fallen short, new models had to be taken 
on. These initiatives were taken without any prior experience which made their outcomes 
unpredictable. Both the diplomacy and the forces on the ground had to learn as they 
went along, but how does an intervening external actor cope with learning while 
performing a vital mission? The objectives of the interventionists may not always comply 
with the desires of the society in question. Peace and eradication of suffering will not 
always be in the interest of all involved parties. Due to the complexity of the wars, one 
initiative might affect the capability of another initiative. They are interdependent, but 
can at the same time be contradictory.  
                                                
1 Positive and negative peace are both terms from the theories of Johan Galtung, presented in the 
theoretical chapter. 
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Adding to the difficulties is the populations’ perception of the interventionists. As 
not everyone is interested in ending the war there might be a risk that the interventionists 
will have to turn their efforts towards those opposing the peace. Can the forces maintain 
their vital impartiality when so many groups with different interests are involved? And, 
since the New Wars transcend borders, will the point of departure of the interventionists 
be neutral, or is their peace-supporting initiatives instead marked by international or 
regional politics? If so, is that necessarily a bad thing? 
There is no doubt that this complexity and the new type of actors in the New Wars 
are difficult to comprehend. In many countries the populations demand that their leaders 
take action against those who cause the human suffering in the New Wars. But the 
conflicts were, and maybe still are, so complex that their solutions are difficult to see. 
Even a negative peace can be a challenge if the ones in power have no wish for it.  
We have articulated the main issues of these difficulties in intervening in New Wars 
in one main question and two sub questions: 
 
How are  the ac tors  engaged in  con f l i c t int erven tion  coping wi th the  complexi ty o f 
New Wars? 
- How can we unders tand the  re ciprocal  re lat ionship be tween warlord regimes  and 
con f l i ct  in t ervent ion i st s? 
- How are  the complexi t i es  o f  neutral i t y  af fe c t ing the  thi rd part i e s´  poss ibi l i ti e s 
o f  con f l ic t  reso lu tion? 
 
 
These questions represent the problems encountered in the resolution of some of 
today’s conflicts. The world is seeing a new development in armed conflict, and it is vital 
that interventionists adapt to the new reality and that the diplomacy and armed forces of 
tomorrow are developed at the same pace as the conflicts themselves.  
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Methodology 
The current chapter is designed to present the reader with an overview of this 
examination and an understanding of the choices made concerning the structure and 
focus of the examination.  
 
The initial interest in doing this project sprang from a variety of things. As already 
mentioned, the number of violent wars of a particular complex nature, New Wars, has 
risen over the past two decades. It seems that the international community has handled 
these conflicts with varying degrees of success. There are different opinions as to the 
reasons for the various successes and failures in dealing with New Wars. So, from the 
outset we chose to focus on the actual peace initiatives taken by the international 
community and the problems that arose in this connection. In brief, we have done this 
by looking at two conflicts within the framework of New Wars, namely the Somali and 
Liberian. To better understand their complexities we present some relevant theories on 
the subject. This theory is further used as background for the actual analysis. Before 
concluding our examination, we have allowed some space to focus on the opinions of 
the organisations in question, on their own role in the conflict. Thus, the focus of the 
project is the initiatives and their consequences seen from a broader perspective. 
  
The Inner Logic and Structure of the Project 
This section will provide an explanatory overview of the structure of the project. This 
is to introduce the reader to the logic of the order of the writings.     
 
Methodology  
As already mentioned, the methodology is designed to give the reader an 
understanding of the examination in hand, how it is planned and what it intends to do. 
The examination is based on two case studies, Somalia and Liberia, but focuses on the 
conflict initiatives rather than the countries. Even so, the project is not a comparative 
study, but a horizontal examination of peace initiatives in New Wars.  
 
Introduc t ion  to  Our Cases  
The two chapters, ‘The Case of Somalia’ and ‘The Case of Liberia’, serve as an 
introduction to the centre of our investigation. The chapters lay down in brief the history 
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of the countries and the way to conflict, though not the actual causes, as that would 
demand an examination of its own. They also touch upon the wartime, in terms of the 
circumstances in the country, as well as the peace initiatives.  
The important thing is that the conflicts and their complexities have guided us to the 
choice of theory. Delving into the cases, as it were, have shown us that they cannot be 
dealt with like one would conventional wars, but must be considered for what they are, 
New Wars. Their complexities are reflected in the theory that focuses on New Wars. 
The chapters are not exhaustive on Somalia and Liberia. Instead they present the 
reader with a quick overview of the countries and their particularities of relevance to this 
investigation. For more in-depth information we refer to the works and articles in our 
bibliography.  
 
Choi ce  o f  Theory  
The investigation of our cases has been a decisive factor in determining the 
composition of our theoretical framework. The study of our cases illustrates emerging 
complexities in terms of aims, actors and the mode of warfare. Since the conflicts in 
Liberia and Somalia bear the marks of New Wars, as will be apparent throughout the 
analysis, we have chosen to draw on different theories on this scientific understanding of 
war. Mary Kaldor, Mark Duffield and Paul Collier give us the primary definitions of New 
Wars and their complexes. It allows us to understand the nature of New Wars and the 
context in which they are fought.  
We will also discuss the differences and similarities with Old Wars as defined by 
Clausewitz. This is done since part of the theoretical approaches to traditional conflict 
resolution has proven valuable to an overall understanding, their shortcomings in relation 
to New Wars aside. The primary theorist used is Johan Galtung. 
Subsequently, the causes of conflicts and their difficulties will be discussed by using 
and defining terms such as ‘identity politics’ and ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’. The reader will 
also be made acquainted with the war economy of New Wars. 
The broad presentation of theories on New Wars is followed by an overview of the 
nature of contemporary, warlord-controlled conflicts on the African continent, in 
particular in failed or collapsed states. This last part is directly focused on our case 
studies. 
The intend of the theoretical presentation is to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the complexities of New Wars and their features, and to present the 
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special nature of the wars of African warlords and the failed states in which many of 
them take place. The theory further enables us to see and discuss issues concerning the 
initiatives pertaining to New Wars.   
 
The Examinat ion - Analys i s  
The analysis is the main body of our project. As we proceed, we will analyse, 
discuss and problematicise the nature and consequences of the events and peace 
initiatives undertaken by the international community. The design of this chapter is 
horizontally structured, meaning that we have chosen key issues from the conflicts, 
across their respective timelines. The themes have helped us categorise the events and 
initiatives. 
Thus, the discussion is built on four main themes, which one by one lead us to 
answer our main question: how actors in conflict intervention are coping with the 
complexities of New Wars.  
 
The theme of the first part, ‘Venturing Manoeuvres – a first time for everyone’, is 
the problems the international community has faced due to their lack of experience with 
conflict resolution in New Wars. The key point of this section is the fact that all peace 
initiatives in these two New Wars were first-time attempts, and thus held unforeseen 
consequences. We examine the effect on the situation this lack of experience had.  
The second part, ‘Of Greed and Security – War Economy’, will concentrate on the 
ubiquitous role war economy plays in New Wars. Concepts such as privatisation of 
security, aid as currency and trans-border shadow activity will be thoroughly dealt with in 
the context of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the importance of external trading 
partners for warlords will be illuminated. This section primarily outlines a complicating 
feature in the conflicts, thus easing the understanding of the position of the warlords in 
New Wars. The effects of this type of war economy on conflict resolution are also 
examined.  
The warlords are dealt with in the third section of the examination, ‘Warlords – 
Cooperation and Legitimacy’. Here we turn to an analysis of the part they play in the war, 
and the difficulty they pose to peacemakers in the conflicts. The fact that they roam in 
failed or collapsed states and the consequences of their domination of stateless countries 
is also debated. Thus the section discuss two connected matters: dealing and cooperating 
with warlords, and inviting them into a recognised political forum. The intent of the third 
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section is, thus, to discuss the problems for peacemakers arising out of a feature 
unknown to most of them: a warlord-dominated society, torn by war that the warlord 
benefits from.  
The fourth section, ‘Striking a Balance in peace making – Neutrality and 
Impartialit’, examines the consequences of a third party losing impartiality and neutrality 
in relation to the conflict. Peace enforcement as an option is problematicised in this 
regard. Furthermore, there is a discussion on the importance of impartiality. Impartiality 
and neutrality is complicated by the features of New Wars, hence causing unforeseen 
problems. The idea is to determine to what extend the complexities of remaining neutral 
as a mediator influences the very peace initiatives.  
Since we have focused on the problems that the international peacemakers have 
encountered in New Wars, the final section, ‘Lessons Learned’, is dedicated to the 
organisations themselves. Here we present their opinions on the role they have played, 
without assessing or evaluating their views. This section is more general than the others, 
as the experience of the organisations pertains to conflict resolution in the 1990s in 
general. With this section we also wish to point out that the focus on the problems is not 
a reflection of presupposed opinions on the efforts of the organisations, but rather a 
consequence of the project’s focus. That we have chosen not to examine those initiatives 
that went smoothly is not a critique, but an interest. 
 
The Key Di f f i cu l t ie s  o f Conf l i c t Reso lut ion  - Conc lus ion  
In the end we conclude upon the problems occurring in the handling of the New 
War conflicts. The conclusions made during the horizontal discussion are combined and 
seen in relation to each other, in order to ultimately answer our main question. 
 
 Our Chosen Cases 
Somalia and Liberia represent the numerous conflicts that have erupted during the 
past decades, and which combine the features of New Wars. The African continent is in 
particular marred by this type of conflict, and a particular violent type, to which the 
Somali and Liberian conflicts are testimonies. Thus, the cases are chosen not because of 
an immense interest in the countries themselves, but rather because they represent the 
very centre of our interest – the difficulty of approaching New Wars as a peacemaker.  
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The intention behind the specific choice of focus on the conflicts in Liberia and 
Somalia is not to make a comparative study. Consequently, neither the similarities nor 
the dissimilarities themselves are essential to the examination, as they will not be 
compared. Instead it adds to the understanding of the level of complexity in the 
conflicts, and thus in New Wars. Our intent with these cases is to give examples of New 
Wars and the peacemaking attempts applied by the international community. 
In that connection one might argue that just two cases will not be representative of 
anything. Nevertheless, the two chosen conflicts contain the essential conditions and 
features of New Wars in Africa. From these two cases it is therefore possible to discuss 
conflict resolution in New Wars in Africa. Even if they are African conflicts, the cases 
themselves also represent the broader perspective of New Wars, making the conclusions 
transferable to New Wars in other parts of the world, albeit with the cultural differences 
in mind.  
 
Empiri cal  Research 
Our data collected to investigate the Somali and Liberian conflicts is 
comprehensive. The focus has been on the empirical data concerning the conflicts. Even 
so, much of our information is gathered from secondary sources, processed data that is. 
This of course has had the impact that the information we have worked with and built 
our examination upon is only in certain cases based upon first-hand experience. The 
subjectivity of eyewitness credentials can bring an examination to a more personal level, 
with a focus on more emotional matters. However, as the focus of this particular 
examination has not been the experiences of the peoples or the intervening actors, but 
rather on the factual part of the events, our data is sufficient to cover this investigation.  
  
Theoretical Perspective 
While investigating our cases it became evident that while traditional conflict 
resolution theories could offer a tool for understanding the very constellation of conflicts 
as a whole, the theories on the features of New Wars are vital to fully understand the 
complexities that so obviously exist in New Wars.   
Our theoretical perspective therefore aims to explain these features. In order to do 
that, we bring into play a number of different theorists. These include Mary Kaldor on 
Old and New Wars, networks in New Wars from Mark Duffield, the terminology of 
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greed and grievances presented by Paul Collier, and warlords and war economy in New 
Wars from Sabrina Grosse-Kettler and William Reno, all political scientists or conflict 
researchers, who have accepted and exercised the notion of New Wars.. From the 
traditional perspective we apply only part of the theories, mainly from Johan Galtung, to 
present the basis of conflict resolution in general. We have left out an in-depth 
presentation of traditional theories based on Old Wars perceptions, as they fall short in 
relation to the complexities of New Wars. 
In recognition of this, we focus our theoretical perspective on New Wars. Still, 
theorists on New Wars have their differences too. The differences amongst the theorists 
used are not emphasised, but are instead used to supplement each other for the sake of a 
broader perspective. They emphasise different elements in New Wars, but all do they 
embrace the interdependence of the complexities. In spite of their differences on the 
origins of New Wars and the cardinal point in the conflicts, they share the view that New 
Wars differs from the Clausewitzean profile of warfare, and that they cannot be ignored.                   
 
Delimitations of the Focus  
Because we have chosen to focus our examination on the complexities of New 
Wars and the international conflict resolution, we automatically limit ourselves from 
other nuances, the many initiatives that have succeeded, such as delivery of aid in 
Somalia, for one. As we have pointed out, the nature of the focus, the problems 
pertaining to conflict resolution in New Wars, limits us from the unproblematic success 
stories. This is shown by the last section in the discussion, as already pointed out.  
A range of other delimitations are a natural consequence of our focus. This 
includes perspectives such as the North-South problematic, examined by for instance 
Mark Duffield, claiming that the North has developed on account of the South. Global 
economy, global governance and other similar perspectives have been left out to keep 
strict focus on the conflicts and intervention problems. 
Another important delimitation is the time frame. Both our case studies are 
relatively complex. In order not to involve the whole comprehensive history of the two 
countries, we have limited the time frame. In Somalia we focus on the period 1988-2004. 
This covers the most important events in the conflict, the international peace initiatives 
and is concluded by elections for parliament in 2004, which was a result of a peace 
agreement. 
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The time frame for Liberia covers 1989-2003. This includes the beginning of 
violence, the most violent periods of the conflict and the different organisations involved 
in the peace process. 2003 marks the end of the dispute.  In neither case, however, does 
this exclude any attention towards relevant events outside of these limits.   
 
Terminology – our use of certain terms in this examination. 
Conflict Resolution - any attempt at solving or dealing with the conflict. Both 
military intervention and civilian initiatives, aimed at the resolution of the dispute or 
steps towards resolution. Conflict Management is used similarly.   
Factions - the groupings of the war. A faction consists of fighters supporting the 
military leader for one reason or another. Always a party to the conflict. 
Humanitarian Intervention - military intervention in times of hardships for the 
population in the country to end or ease suffering directly or indirectly caused by the 
war. Humanitarian intervention can by-pass sovereignty considerations. 
International Community - the global opinion as presented through the media and 
press conferences. The speakers of the international community are perceived as the 
leaders of the great representative organisations, like UN, IGAD, ECOWAS, OAU, 
League of Arab States, EU and others.  
Intervention - when a third party meddles in a conflict in one way or another. The 
presence of forces is not demanded, but is likely. 
Peace Enforcement - the military intervention aiming at enforcing peace on 
unwilling actors. The force is usually mandated to resort to coercion and arms to create 
the peace. Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Peacekeeping - the military intervention with the aim of keeping an already agreed 
to peace. Usually only mandated to self defence, and therefore lightly armed. In the UN 
Charter described under chapter VI. 
Third Party - an outsider to the relationship in question, in this context to the 
conflict. The third party is not a party to the conflict by definition, but can be dragged in 
against its will. 
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The Case of Somalia 
The Conflict in Brief  
During the European scramble for colonies, the Somalis, a relatively homogenous 
people, sharing language, religion and culture, were partitioned into five different 
‘Somalilands’: British Somaliland in the north, French Somaliland in the east and 
Southeast, Italian Somaliland in the south, Ethiopian Somaliland in the West (the 
Ogaden) and finally, what later came to be known as Northern Frontier District of 
Kenya (Samatar 1995:17). Before ‘Somalia’ was divided between the various colonial 
powers it was a land of pastoral nomads with indeterminate borders. The Somalis grazed 
their stock from the Indian Ocean in the east to Djibouti in the north and down to parts 
of Kenya and Ethiopia in the South. 
While Somalia has often been referred to as the most homogenous African state, 
the population is still, and has been for centuries, divided into an extensive system of 
clans, sub-clans and families. In accordance with clan structure the Somali social and 
political relations were based on patrilineal blood ties and marital ties. The balance of 
power among the various clans helped preserve the internal order and security. 
Colonialism changed this when the traditional socio-political system was replaced by 
European governance structures and centralised administration (Thomashausen 2002:52, 
Lillienskjold 1998:79-80).  
When The Somali Republic was established in 1960, only encompassing two of the 
earlier mentioned Somalilands - British and Italian Somaliland - it shattered the Somali 
dream of a ‘Greater Somalia’,  a dream which would later cause Somalia and indeed the 
entire region a great deal of problems. 
During the first nine years of independence the Somali state succeeded in the 
struggle of making it a parliamentary democracy with governments regularly being voted 
into and out of office. This happened regardless of the difficulties of integrating the dual 
legacy of Italian and British administration and territorial disputes with Ethiopia and 
Kenya over the ‘the lost lands’. 
The preoccupation with ‘regaining’ the lost lands lead successive Somali 
governments to an economic and political neglect of the national body politics. The 
sustained support provided for the Somali ‘freedom fighters’ in ‘Greater Somalia’ 
diverted scarce resources, much needed at home for development, to futile and 
unwinnable wars (Samatar 1995:16). 
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When Abd-i-rashid Ali Shermarke, the president at the time, was assassinated in 
1969, Major General Mohammed Siad Barre, leading the joined forces of the police and 
the military, seized power in a bloodless coup. Once in power the new rulers instituted a 
policy of ‘scientific socialism’, dissolving the National Assembly, banning opposing 
political parties, suspending the democratic constitution and centralising the government 
authority by forming a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). This Council was to be 
the new leading force of the country.  Siad Barre strove to erode the clan system in order 
to consolidate his power, and in so doing he undermined the traditional authority of the 
clan leaders, which could otherwise challenge his rule. The clan affiliation was to be 
replaced by national solidarity. In fighting the clan system Barre changed important 
structures in the society which were keeping order internally in Somalia. While formally 
opposing the clan system, Barre in reality based his regime on the support of the Darod 
clan. The subsequent lacking boundary between the political system and the clan system 
resulted in increased politicisation of the clan system (Lillienskjold 1998:80; 
Thomashausen 2002:53; Kleist in Somalia >Flygtninge, baggrund, historie 2003:11).  
Siad Barre, having embraced socialism, also enjoyed military and political support 
from the Soviet Union who, on the other hand, hoped to counterbalance the presence of 
the United States in Ethiopia. The African Horn was thereby turned into another stage 
for the Cold War. The consequent inflow of weapons, which Barre’s regime benefited 
immensely from, would be used in the battle for a Greater Somalia and in the quashing 
of the growing internal dissent to his dictatorial rule. In the mid 1970s as much as 40-50 
percent of the Somali national budget was spent on defence and security (Kleist in 
Somalia >Flygtninge, baggrund, historie 2003:11).  
 
The Soviet support had started to fade when Somalia in the late 1970s began 
supporting ethnic Somali rebels seeking independence for the disputed Ogaden region of 
Ethiopia. When Somalia in 1977 invaded the territory, the Soviet Union turned its back 
on Somalia and, instead, sided with the new Marxist regime in Ethiopia. With military 
help from the Soviet Union and Cuba, Ethiopia was able to repel the Somali assault with 
relative ease. Later the United States, which had previously supported Ethiopia, began 
backing Somalia. This resulted in a continued build-up of the military power (Kleist in 
Somalia >Flygtninge, baggrund, historie 2003:11-12; Thomashausen 2002:53).  
In the aftermath of the Ogaden war, Barre became increasingly unpopular. Political 
and military opposition groups started to emerge, and in April 1978 a group of 
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disgruntled army officers from the Magerteen clan, a sub-clan of the Darod clan, 
attempted a coup d’état. When this failed, it resulted in the execution of all but one of 
the coup supporters and in the complete destruction of the Majerteen holdings in north-
eastern Somalia. The one officer who escaped execution succeeded in escaping into 
Ethiopia, where he founded an opposition movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front (SSDF). This movement soon began to stage cross-border incursions into Somalia 
and in this manner undermine Barre’s rule (Samatar 1995:18). The Somali National 
Movement (SNM), another oppositional movement, was established in 1981 by Issaq 
clan members in exile, with the support of fellow clan members in the northern Somalia. 
Increasingly resentful of Siad Barre, the SNM began to raid government buildings and 
with the support of Ethiopia it also orchestrated cross-border incursions into Somalia.  
The relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia had, ever since the Ogaden war, 
been hostile, but in 1988 a peace agreement was reached between the states. According 
to this agreement the countries could no longer give safe haven to rebel groups opposing 
the other regime in the other country. This left the rebel groups, such as the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), without a patron, forcing them to return to Somalia. Once 
back in the country they advanced into the larger cities of northern Somalia and 
proclaimed independence. Barre’s regime responded by dispatching an army to quell the 
rebellion. The brutal repression that ensued is believed to have killed an estimated 5,000 
Issaq civilians while the capital of northern Somaliland was completely destroyed. An 
additional 300,000 Issaqs are believed to have fled into Ethiopia. 
‘(T)he Somali Armed Forces appears to have engaged in a widespread, systematic and extremely 
violent assault on the unarmed civilian Isaaq population of northern Somalia in places where and 
at times when neither resistance to these actions nor danger to the Somali Armed forces was 
present. The Somali Armed Forces conducted what appears to be a systematic pattern of attacks 
against unarmed, civilian Isaaq villages, watering points and grazing areas of northern Somalia, 
killing many of the residents……many more Isaaq men were systematically rounded up and 
murdered, mainly by having their throats cut, and buried in mass graves, during the four months 
following the intensification of the conflict, apparently solely because they were Isaaq…’ 
(Gersony, Robert, Consultant, Bureau for Refugee Programs, US Department of 
State in Samatar 1995:19-20). 
Following the SNM rebellion, other clans began establishing armed resistance 
movements in their respective regions, for instance did the largest clan, the Hawiye, form 
the United Somali Congress. The signing of the peace agreement by the Ethiopian and 
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Somali heads of states thus became the beginning of the civil war in Somalia (Lewis 
2002:62).  
Due to severe violations of human rights around 1990 Somalia lost large 
proportions of its development aid from abroad, including aid from the United States. 
This was an aid Somalia had been dependent on since independence (Lillienskjold 
1998:81). In 1990, as Barre started to lose control, about 100 prominent political and 
business figures signed the Mogadishu Manifesto, requesting Siad Barre to resign. To 
begin with Barre utterly refused, but subsequently promised a referendum. Fighting 
continued in preparation for the promised multiparty elections. The main factions were 
the earlier mentioned SNM in the north, the United Somali Congress (USC) in central 
Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in the south. 
Barre’s regime came to a disastrous end en early 1991 with the collapse of the 
Somali state. The regime was substituted by armed clan militias fighting one another for 
political power, including those of transitional president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and his 
rival Mahammed Farah Aideed, both former USC leaders. With no central government, 
the country fragmented as rival militias seized or fought over different regions and 
towns. 
 
The International Community Intervenes  
When the international community acted in early 1992, Somalia was no longer only 
dealing with the consequences of the civil war, which caused hundreds of thousands of 
civilians to flee their homes, but was also dealing with a devastating famine. This famine 
was primarily caused by one of the worst African droughts of the century,  and by chaos 
and violence ruining Somalia’s traditional breadbasket, the southern agricultural regions, 
while the plundering of grain stores and the uprooting of local farming populations 
worsened the situation dramatically.  More than half the Somali population, an estimated 
4.5 millions, was at the time threatened by severe malnutrition. 300,000 persons were 
estimated to have lost their lives by November 1991, and 1.5 millions lives were at 
immediate risk. Additionally, one million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring 
countries and elsewhere (United Nations 2003). The delivery of humanitarian aid, to ease 
the suffering of the Somali population, was severely constrained by the compounded 
problem of political chaos, deteriorating security, widespread banditry and looting, and 
the extent of physical destruction. The war and its continuation were furthermore 
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believed to threaten the stability in the Horn of Africa and a threat to international peace 
and security.  
 
In January 1992, after the factions leaders had expressed support for a United 
Nations peace role, the UN in co-operation with the OAU, the Arab League and the 
OIC began its first political mediation, which was to facilitate talks between the parties. 
Another initiative of January 1992 was to impose an arms embargo on the country. The 
talks resulted in the factions agreeing on a ceasefire, to be monitored by United Nations 
observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by United Nations security 
personnel. This led to the establishment, in April, of the United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I), requesting the immediate deployment of 50 unarmed ceasefire 
observers. This resolution was acting under Chapter VI, peacekeeping, of the UN 
Charter. The factions later agreed on the deployment of a security force of 500 soldiers.  
Parallel with UNOSOM I the US ran a solely humanitarian operation called Operation 
Provide Relief.  
In August the Security Council, due to continued fighting and insecurity, decided 
to deploy 3,000 additional troops to protect humanitarian aid, but the situation 
nonetheless deteriorated. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry 
and general lawlessness compounded the situation and the net result was that, while relief 
supplies were ready, only a trickle was reaching those in need. As many as 3,000 persons 
a day were dying of starvation, while the relief warehouses remained stocked. Unless the 
problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it would be 
impossible to provide the assistance which was so urgently needed (United Nations 
2003) 
The United Nations therefore accepted it when the United States in November 
1992 offered to organise and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Subsequently the Security Council in a December 1992 resolution authorised 
the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish a 
secure environment for the relief effort. UNITAF’s mandate differed from UNOSOM’s 
by combining the language of Chapters VI (peacekeeping) and VII (peace enforcement) 
of the UN Charter (Laitin 2001: 3).  
Furthermore, UNITAF was to prepare for a permanent UN state-building mission, 
UNOSOM II.  The US operation Restore Hope that commenced parallel with UNITAF 
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was a merely humanitarian mission with the sole aim of saving civilian lives (Laitin 2003: 
Ibid).  
The deployment of the United Nations Task Force improved the security situation 
which again facilitated the flow of food and other emergency supplies into the areas in 
mostly in need (Prunier 1996: 15). Many areas actually experienced a dramatic decrease in 
malnutrition and death from starvation. The humanitarian and political situation 
remained complex and tense in many parts of the country. Especially the southern and 
central parts of Somalia were destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. 
Lack of access to clean water sources; poor sanitation; and diseases, such as measles and 
diarrhoea furthermore continued to present major health threats. UNITAF, nonetheless, 
only accomplished little progress concerning the disarmament of the militias (United 
Nations 2003) 
Alongside UNITAF, the UN organised two reconciliation conferences between the 
factions. The first resulted in a ceasefire agreement signed by the warlords in January 
1993. During the second, which was held in March, the factions reaffirmed their 
commitment to the ceasefire and a process of disarmament.  They also agreed to form a 
new government within two years and to establish regional and district councils. The 
agreements did not bring peace; the warlords remained at large and looting continued 
(McDonald 57, 63-64). 
In May 1993 the Security Council decided on a transition from UNITAF to a new 
United Nations peace enforcing operation (UNOSOM II). The operation was solely a 
Chapter VII operation. UNOSOM II had a mandate to secure a stable environment for 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist the reconstruction of economical, 
social and political life (Prunier 1996: 20).  
Throughout the summer and fall of 1993 clashes between UNOSOM II and 
Somali militiamen resulted in casualties among both civilians and UNOSOM. After a 
clash between Aideed’s fraction and UN soldiers, in which 24 UN soldiers were killed, 
the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the apprehension of the people 
responsible for the attack. The subsequent hunt for Aideed cost the lives of eighteen US 
soldiers, following which the US withdrew their forces. Later on, several other Western 
countries decided to withdraw their troops (McDonald 2001: 65-67) 
UNOSOM’s mandate was revised in early 1994, stressing assistance for 
reconciliation, and setting March 1995 as a deadline for the mission. In March 1994, 
fifteen political movements signed a declaration on reconciliation; providing for a 
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ceasefire, the disarmament of militias as well as a conference with the objective of 
appointing a new government (Prunier 1996: 22-23). 
Throughout the latter part of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, UNOSOM ability to 
provide security had been reduced by troop withdrawals, budget restrictions and military 
actions by the Somali factions as well as lack of commitment to peace by the factions. 
With the factions not complying with the 1993 and 1994 agreements, the UN withdrew 
completely in March 1995 (Prunier 1996: 23). 
Although the United Nation did not fully achieve its goal in Somalia, it did not 
conceive its work as having been in vain. The worst aspects of the humanitarian tragedy 
confronting the country had been overcome, as a result of the international assistance 
made possible by the UN operation. The scale of fighting and insecurity was furthermore 
significantly reduced (Boutros-Ghali 1996:78). 
 
Following a number of smaller conferences, the Sodere conference was held in 
November 1996 hosted by Ethiopia under IGAD. The conference agreed to establish 
two different committees and a reconciliation conference in 1997, but the agreement was 
never implemented (Ghebremeskel 2002:24-25). 
The next significant peace conferences were the 2000 ARTA I and II held by 
IGAD in Djibouti. It toned down the role of the warlords and focused efforts on the 
clans instead. The outcome was the Transitional National Government (TNG) which 
was recognised by the OAU, the UN, IGAD and the League of Arab States, though not 
by Ethiopia, who supported the later opposition organisation SRRC, Somalia 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation Council (Terlinden, Debiel 2004: 16-17).  
The latest peace conference was held 2002-2004 in Kenya mandated by IGAD. 
Contrary to the ARTA conferences it was based on negotiations between the warlords as 
key players. The first initiative of the conference was a ceasefire agreement between the 
warlords, but without actual effect. The main objective was to negotiate an agreement on 
the distribution of power. This led to the Safari Park Declaration, which contained the 
guidelines for a new Somali parliament. During the two years that the conference lasted, 
it was on the verge of failure a number of times, but eventually the president of Uganda 
successfully intervened. In spite of initial dissatisfaction and lack of support for the Safari 
Park Declaration, the new parliament was established in 2004 in Kenya (Terlinden, 
Debiel 2004: 19).   
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The main points of focus have been outlined to the benefit of the reader, 
introducing a number of initiatives taken by international and regional actors. In general, 
the international actors have focused on military intervention, while the regional actors, 
primarily IGAD, have arranged a number of peace conferences. 
 23 
The Case of Liberia 
 
The Conflict in Brief 
The warring parties ended more than a decade of civil war in Liberia in August 
2003 with the signing of a peace accord. An estimated 200,000 people had lost their lives 
during the first seven years alone, 1989-1996 (Adebajo 2002b:43). Many more were 
displaced and scattered in refugee camps in neighbouring countries before peace was 
finally reached. The UN commenced its second mission, UNMIL, in the country the 
following month, hoping to bring lasting peace to Liberia. 
 
Liberia consists of sixteen major indigenous population groups, each with its own 
traditions, customs, languages and dialects (Bøås 2005:75). In 1847 Liberia was founded 
by freed American slaves and thereby became the first independent nation in Africa 
(Nilsson and Söderberg 2003:3). These freed slaves had been repatriated to the West 
African coast from the United States between 1822 and 1861. During this period they 
counted only 12,000 colonists, who settled down along the coast. However, they were as 
much aliens in Liberia as they had been in the United States.  
The freed slaves built their governmental system on the only political and 
administrative system they knew; the system of plantations from the US. ‘The main 
difference was, of course that this time they were the ‘masters’ and the indigenous population in the 
country they had been given to govern became their slaves’ (Bøås 2005:76).   
Although constituting a mere five per cent of the population, the descendants of 
the ‘Americans’ held power in Liberia for 133 years. During this period the indigenous 
people, not satisfied with the new system of power, revolted on several occasions, but 
were brutally put down. Despite the fact that the Liberian constitution was based on 
American values, according to which all men are born equal and free, natives were not 
eligible for election or voting. The divisions between the ethnic groups and between the 
new upper and lower classes had become institutionalised. The rationale behind this 
division was that the Americo-Liberians, who constituted an emerging elite, could secure 
their economic and political dominance. Thus, at the dawn of Liberian society, hatred 
and mayhem had already infiltrated the governmental structure (ibid).  
By the early 1920s, the Americo-Liberians had secured a firm grip on the political 
and economic power in Liberia. Not only did they control the government, they also 
determined the patterns of distribution of resources in Liberia. This distribution system 
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was motivated by the need to ensure and sustain the positions of those in power through 
alliances with lieutenants, clients and henchmen, who were bound to the elite in a 
reciprocal relationship. This system could be characterised as a patron-client relationship 
ruled by a small elite (Bøås 2004:76).  
In 1944 William Tubman was elected president. Tubman officially advocated a 
policy unification to bring the indigenous people into the political system. However, 
Tubman ended up doing the opposite by building his reign on a combination of personal 
rule and pre-emptive strikes against real or perceived enemies. When he died in 1971, he 
left a government and an aggressive business establishment dominated by relatives, other 
Americo-Liberians and local assimilated tribal entrants. Tubman had relied on the 
informal manipulation of state power to reward loyalty and punish disobedience and 
independence. Those who suffered the most under Tubman’s rule were the indigenous 
peoples. They were mainly seen as providers of the elite and were marginalised 
economically as well as politically (Bøås 2004:76).  
Such a neo-patrimonial system can remain stable only as long as there are enough 
resources to feed the system. Tolbert, however, who succeeded Tubman as president 
over-exploited the system. In spite of his initial attempts at reform, e.g. an anti-
corruption commission, he himself was amongst the greatest offenders and exploiters of 
the neo-patrimonial system (Bøås 2004:77). As inadequate amounts of resources were 
directed back through the system, and Tolbert at the same time was unwilling to use 
force and coercion to the extend Tubman had used it, the people eventually revolted 
against his regime. 
In April 1979 a riot broke out. Tolbert brutally quelled it and arrested almost all the 
rebellious leaders. Unfortunately for him, this only aggravated the situation, and he was 
assassinated shortly after (Bøås 2004:78).          
Amongst the assassins of Tolbert was the new president Samuel Doe. Doe 
belonged to the ethnic group called the Krahn. He made sure that all leading positions in 
Liberia were occupied by people from the Krahn. Nevertheless, he initially appealed to 
most of the native ethnic groups, because they were all weary of Americo-Liberian 
oligarchy (Nilsson and Söderberg 2003:3). Doe’s regime too was caught up in the neo-
patrimonial system turning the administration into a profit-generating machine.  
Gradually ethnic tensions arose as the socially constructed differences increased 
and was institutionalised. Doe’s regime became increasingly abusive and repressive. In 
1985, Doe tried to gain legitimacy by holding popular elections, which he won by fraud. 
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A military coup against the newly elected government failed, and Doe brutally purged 
those responsible, primarily from other ethnic groups. As Liberia’s economy was 
deteriorating throughout the 1980s, the general dissatisfaction with Doe and his 
companions grew significant. For the time being, however, this regime was upheld partly 
because of the support it received from the US. Cold War geopolitical considerations 
made the US support Doe militarily, and they proclaimed his 1985 election a step 
towards democracy (Bøås 2004:78). 
Even so, the Liberian civil war was sparked on Christmas Eve 1989, when the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, initiated an invasion 
from the Ivory Coast. The invasion force consisted of several ethnic groups, even some 
Krahn, who all held grudges towards Doe. Apart from the common objective of toppling 
Doe there was not much keeping the rebel force together. As a result of this, a faction 
called the Independent NPFL (INPFL) soon tore itself loose from Taylor’s group. This 
development continued throughout the civil war with new forces, new factions and new 
factions of factions constantly emerging on the scene. The aims of the various rebel 
groups, and what exactly separated them from each other, were more or less unclear. 
Even as Doe’s rule - along with Doe himself - was terminated in 1990, the divisions and 
fighting continued between the factions, of which Taylor’s NPFL remained the 
strongest. (Adebajo 2002b:40ff)   
 
The International Community Intervenes  
As the civil war was rapidly affecting the neighbouring countries and thousands of 
refugees were crossing the borders, The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) decided to establish the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with a 
mandate to mediate the conflict and report back to ECOWAS. The SMC decided to 
launch the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990 in an endeavour to 
quell the fighting in Liberia. Peacekeeping forces were deployed with the Nigerians at the 
helm. ECOMOG was to supervise a ceasefire and establish an interim government 
without any faction leaders. Initially ECOMOG did succeed in brokering a ceasefire, but 
the NPFL and Taylor resisted. The strife wore on. In September the ECOMOG 
mandate was significantly altered from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as the efforts 
were increasingly focused on subduing the NPFL (Adebajo 2002b:52). No single faction 
had the power to take control of Monrovia, and ECOMOG, as it turned out, only had 
the power to keep them out of Monrovia.  
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In the following years quite a few peace agreements and ceasefires were reached 
but usually broken before the ink had even dried. In November 1990, ECOMOG 
established an interim government (IGNU) in the capital, Monrovia. It was denounced 
by Taylor along with other warlords. They, instead, demanded the instalment of a new 
interim government without ties to ECOMOG, as they believed IGNU had, before they 
would disarm, whereas IGNU could only agree to the establishment of a new interim 
government once disarmament was completed. The situation thus became a stalemate 
(Adebajo 2002b:53).  
The years following ECOMOG’s arrival, 1990-1997, is a ghastly tale of abuse of 
power and men, murder, and failed peace initiatives. The widespread human suffering 
caused by the extremely violent war spilled over into the neighbouring countries. The 
region was affected by the many refugees, destabilisation and the continuously growing 
Liberian shadow economy (Bøås 2004:81-82). 
Despite the horrible situation in the country, the UN did not react until 1992 when 
an arms embargo requested by ECOWAS was finally placed on Liberia. Along with 
ECOWAS and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN participated in 
negotiating the 1993 Cotonou Peace Agreement, which was followed by the UN Observer 
Mission on Liberia (UNOMIL) (Adebajo 2002a:56). Prospects were promising, but the 
agreement failed as it lacked real support from the warlords (Adebajo 2002b:56). 
Two more years of continuous fighting and a couple of short-lived peace accords 
later, two important things happened. The government of Nigeria made peace with 
Taylor which eliminated the NPFL’s main aversion to ECOMOG presence, and in 
August 1995 ECOWAS managed, via a peace accord, to arrange matters so that all the 
Liberian warlords were involved in the power-holding administrative unit (Adebajo 
2002b:61). Implementation once again proved hard. Some warlords were exploiting their 
new positions though, and rivalry turned into renewed violence. Monrovia, thus, was the 
scene of extremely bloody fighting in April and May of 1996. 
The so-called Abuja II Agreement in 1996 was to become the turning point in the 
first part of the conflict. USA and EU had promised full logistical support to all 
ECOMOG contingents for the first time. Sanctions and threats were directed at the 
warlords by ECOWAS as well as the OAU (Adebajo 2002b:62).  ECOWAS made it clear 
that it was no longer to tolerate incompliance with the agreements made. Ceasefire was 
agreed upon by all parties and elections were scheduled for 1997. Taylor won the 
presidency.  
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1997-2000 some progress was made in the Liberian society. Agriculture and 
business became possible. But Taylor’s steadfast interest in his own profits shone 
through. It soon became apparent that Taylor was imitating the Doe regime of the late 
1980s with repressive measures against political opponents and conscious deepening of 
ethnic divisions. Both the economy and the infrastructure were worse off than ever. 
Dissatisfaction grew. 
While this went on, the international community lowered their presence in the 
country, due to what had been achieved. This weakened the opposition in the country, 
but indirect military support was offered them at the same time. Along with economic 
sanctions this weakened Taylor’s position (Bøås 2004:84). 
Small skirmishes occurred frequently until, in July 2000, civil war was reality again. 
It took another three years of fighting before ECOWAS, with the help of others, finally 
managed to convince Taylor to resign and leave the country. By then Liberia was almost 
literally in ruins in every meaning of the word. The state had been weakened by the 
international sanctions imposed on trade as well as the suspension of all aid from EU 
and UN in 2001. 
In June 2003, Nigeria and Gambia succeeded in bringing all parties to the 
negotiation table, which sparked a hope for peace. Sierra Leone, however, demanded the 
prosecution of Taylor, who then fled to Monrovia defending himself from here with 
guns. As it seemed another humanitarian crises was about to break out because of Sierra 
Leone’s poorly timed request, the regional countries were determined not to fulfil it. 
Nigeria offered Taylor sanctuary, and he left Liberia handing over his powers to Moses 
Blah (Bøås 2004:86).  
In August 2003 a peace accord was signed by Moses Blah and the rebel forces. In 
September the UN Security Council deployed the second UN mission to Liberia, 
UNMIL, to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire in what was the most 
unequivocal and substantial international attempt at securing peace in Liberia to date 
(Nilsson and Söderberg 2003:23). The next month peacekeeping responsibility in Liberia 
was officially handed over from ECOWAS to the UN. UNMIL is still overseeing peace-
building initiatives in Liberia. 
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The New Wars, the Old Wars and the International 
Community 
Contemporary conflicts are best understood if compared to traditional conflicts. 
They differ in a number of ways, which is reflected in the international missions trying to 
solve such conflicts. Not only have the character of arms and modes of warfare changed, 
but even the targets, actors and their aims have changed. This outdates the traditional 
way of understanding conflicts and the ways of dealing with them.  
Especially Africa has been exposed to the development of contemporary conflicts. 
Both international and regional organisations have tried to solve the African conflicts, 
but have been impeded by many new unforeseen obstacles. Somalia and Liberia are 
countries where these new obstacles have delayed and even hampered the peace process, 
thus revealing the new challenges of conflict resolution. 
The following chapter will explain these developments and the difficulties they 
pose to peacekeepers. The focus of the first part will be conflicts in general, whereas the 
second part will be related to African conflicts through our cases, Somalia and Liberia. 
The final part will be a brief overview of fundamental considerations in the peace-
supporting of today.  
 
Old or New Wars 
During the 1980s and 1990s a new type of organised violence emerged, primarily in 
Africa and Eastern Europe, which was characterised as New Wars (Duffield 2001; Kaldor 
1999). The new wars are by nature different from conventional wars, or Old Wars. 
Clausewitz was an exponent of the traditional understanding of wars. He defined war as 
‘(…) an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will’. (Kaldor 1999:15)  Thus, 
in the Clausewitzan sense, modern wars were between states and revolved around 
definable goals, e.g. state interests. Old Wars represented a state actively expanding or 
defending a territory by a massive concentration of military force. Furthermore, the great 
wars of the 20th century, World War II, and the Cold War, were increasingly about 
ideologies; Typically, socialism vs. fascism, or socialism vs. democracy and vice versa. 
The essence of these wars was presented as struggles between good and evil.  
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In the conventional wars, the power and economy were centralised. In addition, 
the chain of command in these wars was hierarchically organised, and the war was a 
rational instrument for the pursuit of state interests. In the traditional understanding, the 
socially organised activity that we perceive as war is defined by clear distinctions between 
private and public, civil and military, and legitimate bearers of arms and non-combatants 
(Kaldor 1999:15-30).  
 
The inherent aim of New Wars is not the expansion of territory by overwhelming 
force. The new wars are contrasted with Old Wars in terms of aims, methods of warfare 
and the financing of the latter. Furthermore, New Wars should be seen in the context of 
globalisation, which means that they are based on networks - political, economic, and 
military as well as cultural. Thus, a New War cannot be understood in an isolated way, 
but only in a globalised context (Kaldor 1999:1-5).  
One of the primary characteristics of the New Wars is the changed mode of 
warfare. In the Old Wars, as mentioned above, the units were vertically organised with a 
hierarchical structure. They fought to expand or defend a national territory, disseminate a 
certain ideology, or other such political ends. The New Wars are typically characterised 
by a multiplicity of types of fighting units, public or private, state or non-state, or a 
mixture. They comprise paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, 
mercenary groups, as well as regular armies and breakaway units. Somalia, for instance, 
has seen the worst fighting between Aideed and Mahdi, two rivalling warlords whose 
factions have split up into more factions (Prunier 1996:8). The organisation of these 
units is highly decentralised and operates through a mixture of confrontation and 
cooperation. The strategies of the new warfare draw on the experience from both 
guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Actors in the new warfare tend to avoid battle as 
long as possible and instead hold territories through political control of the population. 
This strategy is not intended to win the sympathy of the population, but instead to 
sow ‘fear and hatred’, a destabilising warfare technique inspired by counterinsurgency 
methods. This is done with the aspiration of controlling the population by getting rid of 
all potential rivals. Hence, the strategic goals of the New Wars are population expulsion 
through mass killings, forcible resettlements as well as political, psychological, and 
economic techniques of intimidation (Kaldor 1999:7-8). New warfare is contingent upon 
continuing fear and insecurity and upon the perpetuation of hatred of the other parties. 
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This is the reason why most of these wars are directed at civilians, which causes an 
increase in the number of refugees and displaced persons (Kaldor 1999: ibid).  
A subsequent feature is asymmetry. New Wars are asymmetrical in the ways they 
are fought, the ways they are financed, and in their targets (Leech 2002:4). In 
conventional wars the enemy is the opposing army, and both armies fight with somewhat 
similar technological means. In New Wars the population is often the target, which 
makes the wars asymmetrical as the fighting of trained soldiers with weapons tends to be 
directed civilians defending them themselves with the scanty means available to them. By 
striking at non-combatants and spreading terror, the fighting units strive to force their 
will through.  
 
Causes of Conflicts  
The causes of the new wars are difficult to define, above all because:  
‘The new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence 
between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence 
undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-
scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organised groups 
against individuals)’ (Kaldor 1999:2).  
The causes of conflict can be very complex and thus be difficult to approach due 
to the blurring of the scenes, aims and actors in new wars. However, the causes of 
conflict are widely perceived to rest upon poverty, communication breakdown, resource 
competition, social exclusion and crime (Duffield 2001:13). 
 
‘Them’ or ‘Us’  
Identity politics can be a potentially important element of new wars. A particular 
identity can be used as an instrument to legitimise a claim for certain objectives e.g. state 
power. Focusing on ethnic, racial, religious or clan-based identity can help mobilise 
movements and thereby escalate the conflicts. In Liberia, particularly in the early stages 
of the civil war, ethnic affiliations were very significant when the warring factions were 
recruiting new members. They received most volunteers from ethnic groups who felt 
mistreated by e.g. the Krahn clan that held many influential positions in the government 
(Nilsson and Söderberg 2003:3-4). The most important feature of identity politics is the 
labelling and the borders portrayed, the ‘us’ and the ‘them’. ‘They (political groupings) acquire 
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meaning through insecurity, through rekindled fear of historic enemies, or through a sense of being 
threatened by those with different labels’ (Kaldor 1999:78). In the Balkan wars of the 1990s the 
different identities had a vast influence on the war. The labelling of the ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
based on seemingly traditional identities, offered justification for the fighting. Even 
though this deliberate manipulation of identity sentiments provides both a meaning to 
the conflict and a justification of it, the aim of the violent struggle is nevertheless still 
about gaining access to or even control over the state (Kaldor 1999:84).      
                           
Grievances  or Greed 
While some theorists emphasise identity politics as the trigger of New Wars, others 
argue that they are exclusively about resource competition. The search for the causes of 
conflict often leads to the greed versus grievance dichotomy. What exactly is at the core 
of conflicts has been widely debated through time. Some theorists believe that the 
essence of conflict is greed; the strife for power and economic enrichment. Others 
believe that the conflicts are motivated by grievance; the struggle to survive, literally as 
well as symbolically, as an individual or as a group, in times of hardship, challenges or 
pressure.  Head of the World Bank Research Development Group, Paul Collier argues 
that conflicts ‘(…) are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance’ 
(Collier 1999:1). This indicates that conflicts are not as much triggered by an unjust 
regime or ethnic hatred as they are triggered by the fact that some actors, local or global, 
see conflict as an opportunity to make profit, as prosperous business.  Some argue that in 
the modern globalised world, conflicts can be used by those who are excluded from the 
global economy to seek inclusion through parallel and trans-border activities, vested in 
international networks. In this way it is possible to become reintegrated in the liberal, 
global economy. The New Wars can be a way of generating profit for the faction leaders. 
The warring factions can base their narratives on grievance, but in essence they are 
motivated by greed (Duffield 2001:132), ‘The true cause of much civil war is not the loud 
discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed’ (Collier 1999:8).  
 
War Economy  
New wars are not fought by a state. Neither are they financed by one. They are 
defined as non-territorial network wars, working through and around states. In some 
conflicts it can be argued that the war springs from one particular country. This is mostly 
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the case on the African continent where the states are often fragmented, non-existent 
and where the power is decentralised. In addition, the state exposed to civil war is likely 
to experience a large decrease in domestic production and an according increase in 
unemployment. There is a high possibility that the production will collapse due to side 
effects of the war, such as liberalisation, the withdrawal of state support, physical 
destruction, cut off markets, blockades from inside or outside powers, or even the 
fighting units in the war-torn areas (Kaldor 1999:90-101). The domestic production 
cannot, not even in the hands of warlords, finance the war. The warlords then depend on 
external income in the form of remittances from the diasporas and ‘taxation’ of 
humanitarian aid, and most commonly, by illegal trade with the country’s natural riches 
(Kaldor 1999:9). As described in the chapter ‘Of Greed and Security – War Economy’ 
below, the sale of timber has been fundamental for the financing of the civil war in 
Liberian. Foreign trade partners and aid organisations unwittingly finance the warlords 
and, thus, prolong the conflict. This became evident in the Somali conflict, which only 
further complicated conflict resolution (Grosse-Kettler 2004:11).  
    
A New War is a very complex organism. The actors are many and their goals 
incompatible with peace, since they benefit from the war in itself. The New Wars are not 
only fought between soldiers, but often among and against civilians. The globalised 
context in which they take place makes them even more intricate to comprehend. 
National borders do not limit the fighting and financing. The many interrelated and yet 
opposing features of New Wars have made it a difficult phenomenon to grasp for peace 
organizations as well as conflict resolution theorists. 
  
Conflict Management Theories 
This chapter will offer an introduction to general conflict resolution theories. 
However, the conflict resolution theories build on inherited ways of thinking about 
organised violence, along the lines of Old Wars. The theories show an inability to 
understand the character and logic of the New Wars. Instead the theories address the 
new wars by treating them as old wars with conceptions of nation states and modern 
wars (Kaldor 1999:113). Furthermore, conflict resolution theories do not include terms 
like ‘greed’. Consequently, the basis for the theories is that conflicts can indeed be 
solved. The main focus is instead on terms such as ‘basic needs’, which resembles the 
concept of grievance.   
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Still, some features of the theories can be transferred to New Wars, and some 
theorists have made an effort to expand their theories to include the complexity of New 
Wars. 
 
Most traditional conflict resolution theories are based on the so-called basic-needs 
theory, composed of two main elements: interests and needs. The basic-needs theory 
addresses the underlying cause of conflict. The term ‘interests’ defines the material issues 
of a conflict. Interests are non-negotiable. They can not be shared equally. Human beings 
have certain ontological basic needs, which are common across cultures and other 
socially constructed boundaries: identity, recognition etc. They are non-negotiable, 
mutually reinforcing and are not limited. E.g. if one part has more security, so does the 
other (Burton 1984). If interests or needs are deprived, a conflict will break out. 
However, the conflict need not be overt at all times (Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
1999). 
Johan Galtung further elaborates this in his ideas about negative and positive 
peace, referring to the fact that conflicts can be either latent or manifest (covert or 
overt).  
In order to explain these terms we will first present Galtung’s conflict triangle. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
Contradiction refers to the incompatible itself, the core issue that the parties are 
striding about. 
Attitude is emotional or cognitive assumptions or misconceptions of other actors 
or of the situation. The assumptions can be both positive and negative; the latter will 
occur in conflicts. 
C Contradiction  
Attitude A B Behaviour 
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Behaviour may be hostile body language, verbal acts or actual fighting. As with 
attitude, behaviour is not only negative but can refer to cooperation as well as hostility, 
e.g. violence. 
To have a fully articulated conflict all three levels must be present. But a conflict is 
not manifest until the B-level is present, and accordingly, if the B-level is absent, the 
conflict is latent. The B-level refers to consciousness. To be manifest, the conflicting 
parties must be conscious of their dispute. Both manifest and latent periods can be 
observed in the Somali and Liberian conflicts. In Somalia, in the pre-1991 period there 
was a latent conflict which did not become manifest due to the tough rule of the 
dictatorship. Underneath the relative peace, there were conflicts waiting to erupt and 
become manifest as they eventually did in 1991 when the regime of Siad Barre fell.  
If the conflict is fully articulated, a resolution must include a de-escalation of all 
three levels. To disarticulate a conflict the articulation itself, the B-level, must first be 
removed. This kind of peace, when only the B-level is diminished, is called negative 
peace and is defined by the absence of direct violence. Though the violence is removed 
the conflict and the assumptions are still there. Usually peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping provide negative peace, after which a long period of peace-building 
follows, where the other levels of the conflict triangle can be addressed. According to 
Galtung’s theory, positive peace is when the grounds for the conflict, lying in the A and 
C levels, are ultimately removed, C being the actual cause of the conflict. However, this is 
where the theory falls short in the New Wars context. C is the incompatible itself, but 
has a positive/negative-sum nature (Johan Galtung 1996 and Miall, Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse 1999). Due to above all greed, New Wars have a zero-sum nature. The 
incompatible is not necessarily a deprivation of needs, in New Wars. Rather, the war 
itself is the goal, and peace the incompatible. In New Wars, this paradox must be 
removed to achieve positive peace.  
 
Galtung´s conflict triangle relates to conflicts in general, whether it is in an armed 
conflict or educational perspective, in a working environment or a social context. It is 
therefore a universalistic model that can be applied in many different types of conflicts. 
But in this context we find it too simplistic as it does not address the very complex issues 
of the motives and interests for the prolonging of the New Wars. This does not apply for 
Galtung’s theories alone, but for the other traditional conflict resolution theories that are 
founded on a Clausewitzean understanding of war.  They do not, in our opinion, fully 
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grasp the complexity of New Wars, and the terms and concepts of the theories are not 
only difficult to apply to New Wars, but can easily create an obstacle to choosing the 
appropriate conflict resolution initiative (Kaldor 1999:113). Furthermore, as Collier 
argues, the narratives of grievance are easier to comprehend by the international 
community than are the narratives of greed. The discourse of conflict management today 
is dominated by ‘grievance’ rather than the rationale in greed. By addressing grievance, 
peacemakers tend to focus on the articulation itself and not the underlying causes of 
conflict, which are often motivated by economic opportunities (Collier 1999).   
The understanding of negative and positive peace can be applied to that which is 
termed New Wars. With these terms follows Galtung’s perception of conflict as interplay 
between the three levels. This could in fact be applied, if only as a way to clarify the 
complex conflicts. What must be remembered is, as noted above, this theory cannot 
present a full analysis of New Wars, nor can it present an effective resolution model. It 
does not take into consideration that in these wars there does not necessarily have to be 
an incompatible issue. This model presupposes that the war is fought out of grievance, 
but as noted above, these wars are often based on greed.  What this model can do is to 
help the analyst comprehend certain features inherent in any conflict, such as the 
assumptions, behaviour and the understanding of negative and positive peace. But in 
order to understand New Wars, one must take the complexities into careful 
consideration. 
 
African States- the Frame of Our Analysis  
In recent years, a number of countries, particularly in Africa, have experienced a 
more or less complete succumbing of the central state apparatus, followed by the 
emergence of warlord regimes. In this post-Cold War phenomenon the local rulers have 
lost their internal authority due to the removal of their political and economic support 
from the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The patronage 
politics of old have gradually been undermined and this has left the rulers vulnerable vis-
à-vis local, enterprising strongmen (Reno 1998:9,220). The states might have been weak 
during the Cold War era, but the economic and military aid from external powers 
secured the stability of the state to a certain extend and allowed the patron to satisfy his 
clients. After 1989, though, attention as well as aid drifted away from many such nations 
and left the state fragile and without the necessary means to control the distribution of 
resources, resulting in a gradual decentralisation of the economy (Kaldor 1999:9).  
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Many African states can be characterised as either weak, failed or collapsed. 
Primarily we must determine what is meant by strong and weak states in order to explain 
the conditions of the Somali and Liberian states respectively. Weak states can be 
narrowed down to failed and collapsed states for the sake of clarity. However, the 
theoretical characterisation of failed and collapsed states, and the distinction between the 
terms, is inconsistent in the scientific literature. Therefore, we define these terms in a 
broader perspective, in which we do not rely on one specific definition, but find our 
understanding in an overall perspective.   
A strong state is characterised by vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Strong states in 
control of their territories can provide benefits to their citizens, both politically and 
economically. This could be security, infrastructure, law, business environment etc. In 
return the citizens are loyal to the state and its institutions.  
Many African states are unfortunately marked by the opposite. They have a low 
degree of vertical and horizontal legitimacy. They are often economically and politically 
weak and the government, if one exists, is not respected as an authority. Many African 
states are characterised as failed states, providing few or no benefits to their citizens. The 
economic structure has failed, the health care system is in a poor state and the 
educational system is a disaster. In the absence of a central state and state functions, the 
collective good is no longer served by any official party (Reno 1998:1). 
In a collapsed state, on the other hand, there is a complete vacuum of authority. 
‘State collapse is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the 
structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order has fallen apart (…)´ (Zartman in 
Lillienskjold 1998:42). Bureaucratic institutions are all but non-existent. This reflects that 
the state cannot manage any basic functions, and hence the state loses its significance as 
an institution and ultimately fades away. Thus in a collapsed state there are no legitimate 
leader, no set of rules and no central army etc (Lillienskjold 1998:40ff). 
 
Liberia and Somalia – Fai led or Col lapsed? 
The states in Liberia and Somalia have faced serious problems through the times 
and have drifted between the different state categories. In this section we will attempt to 
determine which category we think Somalia and Liberia respectively fall into.   
Up until 1980 descendants of the freed American slaves ruled Liberia, even though 
they constituted only 5% of the population. The remaining sixteen ethnic groups were 
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excluded from power. In 1980, Samuel Doe, who belonged to an oppressed clan, the 
Krahn, overthrew the government in a coup d’état. This marked the beginning of 
Liberia’s state failure.  
As the rules of other leaders of Liberia, Doe’s became repressive. After 1985, US 
economic support to the country was terminated. Already prior to this, Liberia had 
financial problems, including a decline in export of primary products. The situation 
deteriorated with the termination of American support and with the monopolisation of 
power  
In 1989, when civil war erupted in Liberia, Doe’s support had already faded over 
the preceding years. Thus weakened and with no US financial support, Doe’s opponent, 
Charles Taylor, was able to challenge him. The ultimate failure of the state began when 
Taylor’s faction, the NPFL, occupied most of the Liberian territory (Lillienskjold 
1998:68-72). The event set off ethnic and political disintegration, which are central 
characteristics of failed states.  
What makes Liberia a failed state and not a collapsed state is that some sort of 
government, however feeble, has existed at all points throughout the conflict. The 
government’s power rarely reached beyond the capital to the whole territory, thus 
making it a failed state. This was a consequence of Taylor’s control over almost 90 % of 
the territory (Lillienskjold 1998:73). This meant that the government could not offer the 
population any benefits or security. In return, the population did not recognise, let alone 
respect, the authority of the government. Even Taylor did not manage to gain the 
complete control of the country although he was democratically elected in 1997. Due to 
this lack of central control, we characterise Liberia as a failed state.  
Somalia, on the other hand, can be characterised as a collapsed state in the period 
1991-2000. The former colonial powers had left Somalia divided artificially. The Somali 
people are in some ways homogeneous since they all speak the same language and share 
the same religion. But the population is divided into a clan-based system. This clan 
structure was oppressed during the colonial period, but from the first day of 
independence it once again affected the political system (Prunier 1996:1). The order and 
security in the country were widely based on the balance of power between the clans.  
Siad Barre’s inauguration as president led to the first stages of the state 
deterioration. During his regime there was a central government, but it was founded on 
the clan system. Very few clans were represented and those who were were all related to 
Barre’s own clan. Though the regime was supported by a handful of strongmen from a 
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carefully selected group of clans, the regime was controlled by Barre and it worked only 
in his personal interest (Prunier 1996:5). There was mass-scale corruption and abuse of 
traditional political structures. During Barre’s presidency, only a few clans controlled the 
state. Hence, this was a failed state and not a collapsed state.  
In 1991 the international support for Siad Barre’s regime had been withdrawn and 
it increasingly became impossible for him to remain in power. He only controlled 10-
15% of the country, and when the forces of seven clans united to overthrow Barre it was 
impossible for him to resist. On 27 January Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in a tank, taking 
with him gold and foreign currency with an estimated value of $US 27 million (Prunier 
1996:7).  
Shortly thereafter heavy fighting occurred between the formerly united clans over 
the state power vacuum. This resulted in a state of chaos in which no warlord could 
prevail; therefore no government emerged, and the state apparatus completely 
disappeared. This left Somalia as one of the most illustrative examples of complete state 
collapse. The country suffered from an economic collapse and for years Somalia was 
without any recognised government that could claim legitimate authority. The power 
vacuum was absolute. The only entity that defined Somalia to the surrounding countries 
was the border. In effect, the Somali state was collapsed for years, and not until the 
Kenya conference has it started its journey back to more controlled conditions.  
  
Warlords  in  Fai led and Col lapsed States  
Often, failed and collapsed states are controlled by small elite-like warlords who 
take advantage of the failed system. This has indeed been the case in Liberia and Somalia. 
The warlord authority in typical African failed states revolves around control over the 
resources. Violence is used as a means to attain this control, which thus enables the 
warlord to distribute wealth and build political alliances at his discretion (Reno 1998:8). 
Generally accepted concepts of legitimacy and institutional bureaucracy are of no 
importance to warlords, who seek to enhance their power through the control of markets 
(Reno 1998:15). The territorial limits are blurred and are likely to transcend national 
borders. 
The emergence and development of warlord regimes have been reliant on the 
external non-state allies, be it creditors, business partners, money launderers, arms 
suppliers, or even foreign state officials, who constitute private commercial networks 
and, thus, important sources of wealth. In trading with foreign agents a warlord not only 
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accumulates more wealth but also closes these global markets to potential rivals. There is 
no state to regulate competition or enforce the rule of law. The struggle over resources 
and markets is left unrestricted with the warlord factions (Reno 1998:4,8,36).  
Warlords have much more in common with businessmen than they do traditional 
rulers. Rarely is there any apparent ideology or political purpose stated. Enrichment in 
itself is the higher purpose, which is also why they are so reluctant to end the war 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004:5). As with the cause of the conflict being greed rather than 
grievances, the same only applies to a higher degree once the conflict escalates. ‘If economic 
agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from conflict and that these 
groups therefore have some interest in initiating and sustaining it. Civil wars create economic 
opportunities for a minority of actors even as they destroy them for the majority’ (Collier 1999:1). The 
warring parties will have a strong incentive to deliberately sustain and prolong the war. 
The war becomes a ‘rational economic action’ as any other business venture with the inherent 
aim of profit, i.e. the rationale of greed (Grosse-Kettler 2004:4). Warlords in New Wars 
thus ‘(…) builds a sustainable system based on violence, greed and grievance, as profit is generated not 
out of a final military victory, but out of war itself (Grosse-Kettler 2004:4). The vital factor here 
is the reliance on external resources. 
Aid is an additional external resource, which in the hands of a warlord, can be 
made into a business opportunity. By controlling and hindering the flow of incoming aid, 
the warlords can put taxation on the aid. Reluctantly, the relief organisations will have to 
choose between providing the aid and accordingly pay off the warlords, or disregarding 
the needs of the civilian casualties in the conflict by not delivering the aid. 
The failed and collapsed states such as Liberia and Somalia contain many profitable 
opportunities for warlords, external business partners as well as anyone else with a gun 
and a sound entrepreneurial spirit. Income can be generated through e.g. extortion and 
the privatisation of security (Grosse-Kettler 2004:6). Violence becomes business. Thus, 
the warlords have no incentive to either build new bureaucratic institutions or end the 
fighting.  
The domination of warlords in many African conflicts, including the Somali and 
Liberian conflicts, poses a severe challenge for potential peacemakers. The profit made 
from the war itself is what perpetuates the conflict, which leaves the warlords with no 
incentive to end the war, unless presented with a more profitable solution (Grosse-
Kettler 2004:7).  
 
 40 
Intervention in New Wars     
Before turning to the analysis of international intervention in Somalia and Liberia, 
we will briefly comment on the possibilities for intervention in contemporary conflicts by 
international organisations.  
Most people would assume that the deployment of military forces is the first step 
in peacemaking. This is not so. Before anything else, preventive diplomacy should be 
taken into consideration. Preventive diplomacy is action taken against potential conflicts, 
i.e. in vulnerable places and times, in order to prevent the use of armed force 
(Frederking, Pyatt, Randol 2000:1). Failing to employ preventive diplomacy entails the 
risk of missing the opportunity to solve the conflict altogether. 
Since the days of the Cold War, and still today even, most international 
organisation, like the UN, the OAU (now AU), ECOWAS and IGAD, who have all been 
present in either the Somali or Liberian conflict, have had a non-interference policy. This 
means that interference in internal disputes has been unacceptable (Lillienskjold 1998:49-
50). Intervention therefore has been accepted only by invitation from the state authority, 
hence the need for consent in peacekeeping missions. 
The New Wars posed a problem to this understanding of intervention. In failed 
states no authority can invite a peacekeeping force, and even if they do, as in Liberia, the 
reach of their power may not be sufficient to secure the access of a peacekeeping force. 
Other factions may view the forces as invasion forces (Lillienskjold 1998:45). The 
principle of non-intervention, sovereignty and humanitarian law thus collide, since 
civilians often become targets in New Wars.  
In contemporary conflict resolution the international organisations have found a 
way around this: humanitarian intervention. If the parties to the conflict have no desire 
to end the conflict, as is the case in many New Wars, and the suffering of the population 
in the war-torn area is immense, the organisations intervene in the name of humanitarian 
law. Since peace does not exist at such a point, peace enforcement is used. State 
sovereignty, the organisations claim, is not violated in failed or collapsed states. No 
legitimate power exists and therefore it cannot be violated (Lillienskjold 1998:45-50). 
This was indeed the case when Somalia was stateless. Still, before intervening, the 
international organisations do try to obtain the consent of internal factions, though not 
always successfully. 
The question then remains whether these methods are comprehensive enough to 
deal with the complexities of New Wars, and if the organisations in fact clarify and 
 41 
analyse the conflicts sufficiently before intervening or trying to mediate between the 
many factions and profit-seeking warlords.  
 
In sum, we can say that for a third party, intervention of any kind must be based 
on an understanding of the underlying causes of the conflict. Roughly, they can be basic 
needs or interests, which, as described, are related to the dichotomy of greed and 
grievance, a common feature in conflict theory. Many contemporary conflicts are 
complicated by the context in which they take place.  
The conventional war still exists, but the new wars with their unconventional, 
asymmetric warfare and warlord economy are becoming more frequent, here exemplified 
by the civil wars of Somalia and Liberia. Warlords operate primarily from greed, which 
affects both causes and financing. They conduct their business in a global context, across 
boarders and around states. Often their own country is without influential state 
institutions, which allows them to make war a business opportunity. 
Having summed up the key elements of our theoretical framework, we will now 
use it to examine and understand the conflict resolution initiatives in Somalia and 
Liberia. 
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Venturing  Manoeuvres – a First Time for Everyone 
 
Conflict Resolution – a New Experience 
Extinguishing the flames of violent conflict in Africa of the 1990s has proven 
to be a challenge to many an aspirational intervening actor. There have been quite a few 
of these conflicts and many are still unresolved to this date. They have been described as 
New Wars or complex emergencies, depending on individual liking (Alao, MacKinlay and 
Olonisakin 1999:5). The civil wars of Somalia and Liberia are but two examples of this 
kind. Though these conflicts take place in roughly the same period and on the same 
continent, they differ. In Liberia, the regional actor ECOWAS played a crucial role, while 
the UN acted more as a supporting entity. In Somalia, the primary actors from the 
international community were the UN and the US, who both later on withdrew from 
Somalia, whereas the former stayed on in Liberia. The novelty of these crises naturally 
applies to the peacemaking actors too. They have to adapt to new circumstances and find 
entirely new ways of dealing with armed conflicts, not always free of error in doing so. 
 
In i t iat ing In terven t ion  – UN in Somalia 
The first initiative taken by the international community in Somalia was the UN 
deployment of a monitoring group of 50 observers. In the Somali capital two warlords, 
Sergeant Mahdi and General Aideed, had fought over control of the city. The Mogadishu 
War had left the city devastated and the number of casualties was immensely high 
(Prunier 1996: 12). The mission of the UN observers was to monitor a ceasefire 
following the Mogadishu War, but in fact they had little chance of doing so, primarily 
because they were inattentive to the situation on the ground.  
The first UN contingent consisted, apart from the 50 unarmed observers, of 500 
lightly armed soldiers. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) had 
made an agreement with a local faction leader that the airport would be used as 
headquarters for the UN contingent. Meanwhile, the airport was situated in an area 
under the overall control of General Aideed, and he himself did not approve of the 
deployment of international troops to the airport. He opposed, since he was the only one 
with the authority to approve such an agreement. So, he isolated the troops inside the 
airport. Since the UN mission was only mandated to defend themselves and their 
positions, they could not fight their way out of the airport through the surrounding 
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forces (McDonald 2001: 54). Consequently, the first UNOSOM mission had very little 
effect. ‘Permanently threatened by all warring parties, somewhat lost and isolated in a hostile 
environment, they had remained holded up in the international airport doing very little’ (Prunier 1996: 
13).  
The outcome of this mission, which was virtually nil, suggests that the international 
forces had insufficient knowledge and understanding of what they were facing once they 
arrived in Somalia. It seems obvious that they were taken by surprise, possibly due to the 
lack of experience with intervention in a New War. It could be argued that had they been 
aware of the gravity of the situation, they would have deployed a massive force from the 
beginning, and not a lightly armed peacekeeping force with a weak mandate.  
The lack of experience is a continuing problem throughout the different periods of 
intervention in Somalia. Very illustrative examples of this are the comments in the media 
of the American and European leaders prior to the intervention in Somalia. The French 
Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs said that ‘the international intervention will succeed 
very quickly because we are faced here only with young teenagers with machine guns who are just going to 
run away’ (Prunier 1996: 14). In reality, this was clearly not the case. In fact, the factions 
proved to be very capable ‘clan based political militias’ (Prunier 1996: 15), who turned out to 
be the main obstacle for the UN and US missions throughout the period of the 
intervention.  
The initial problems were caused by international arrogance and ignorance. The 
international community was simply unaware of the skills and resilience of the forces 
they would encounter, and therefore they perceived themselves superior to the African 
rebel armies. The reason could be ignorance of the different character of the Somali 
society on the part of the intervening actors. Such a problem is likely to occur when an 
organisation intervenes on a foreign continent while holding insufficient data on the 
prevailing norms. However, in the case of Liberia, the international community, 
represented by West Africa’s own sub-national organisation, the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) faced problems of another kind as they intervened in 
a state in their own region. Their problems were not caused by lack of knowledge, but, in 
some ways, rather the opposite. 
 
ECOWAS – the  Regional Actor in Liberia 
The Liberian conflict which took place 1989-2003 has been referred to as a 
‘peacemaker’s nightmare’ because of the many parties actively involved in it, and the sheer 
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unpredictability of these actors (Olonisakin 2003:114). In Liberia, this nightmare 
primarily belonged to ECOWAS, which originally was an economic collaboration. 
According to political scientist Adekeye Adebajo (2002a:248), there were three levels of 
difficulties to overcome in order to turn events and create peace in Liberia: The lack of 
external assistance for logistics and legitimacy; political consensus within the region; and 
cooperation from the warlords spurring the war. The following will touch upon these 
issues, although not in full. 
One major issue that marred all attempts of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) at getting the warring factions to demobilise and disarm, and at 
creating peace in Liberia, was the internal divisions in the peacemaking organisation 
itself, ECOWAS, on the matter of intervention and approach. The Francophone and the 
Anglophone countries of the region were historically divided on many issues stemming 
from colonial times. The former held grudges towards Samuel Doe and were therefore 
eager supporters of Charles Taylor’s, while e.g. Nigeria and the Gambia had been on 
friendly terms with the Doe regime. The point is, that at the time of initiating the peace 
initiatives with the launching of ECOMOG, most of the Francophone members of 
ECOWAS, above all the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, protested and refused to 
contribute troops and resources to ECOMOG, due to concerns over Nigerian 
dominance of the project. They furthermore questioned the legitimacy of such an action 
towards a fellow member of ECOWAS, since intervention in internal disputes was in 
disagreement with the charter (Jaye 2003:154). It was thus a crippled actor who 
intervened in the Liberian civil war. The difficulties this caused for the forces on the 
ground is likely to stem from the fact that this was the first time ECOWAS deployed 
such a mission. They had no prior experience telling them what problems a divided and 
potentially partial force could lead to.2   
That only some members of ECOWAS decided to take part in the peacekeeping 
force meant that ECOMOG from the very beginning suffered from lacking strength, 
capacity, resources and legitimacy. The inherent problem is fourfold. First, it was harder 
to negotiate and deal with the warlords, and put pressure on them, with insufficient 
strength and military power. ECOMOG simply did not have enough might to put 
behind its words and threats towards the factions. Likewise, they had difficulties 
unleashing their actions beyond the city limits of Monrovia, as their whole capacity was 
needed just to ensure security for the population and the Interim Government of 
                                                
2 The question of partiality in the ECOMOG is further examined in the chapter ”Neutrality”. 
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National Unity (IGNU) in the capital. In the provinces the warlords needed not worry 
about ECOMOG (Aning 1999a:244).  
Second, with few contributors to the monitoring force, logistics and materials were 
in short supply, again obviously affecting the capacity of forces. Poor wages and second-
rate equipment probably did nothing to strengthen the morale and heighten the 
enthusiasm with which the ECOWAS troops set to work.  
Third, some of the Francophone nations not participating in ECOMOG 
deliberately counteracted the peace process by assisting certain warlords (Alao 2000:13). 
E.g. the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso supported the NPFL with arms and sanctuary, 
which allowed Taylor to attack Liberia across the Ivorian borders. But also Sierra Leone 
and Guinea saw it fit to complicate affairs with assistance to another faction (Adebajo 
2002a:243). This kind of subversive activity continued throughout most of the conflict 
and did little to promote the peace initiatives of ECOMOG. Either these countries had 
their own agendas or they acted merely in defiance of Nigerian dominance in 
ECOMOG. Whatever their reason, one of the consequences was that the embargos on 
arms and trade, which ECOWAS tried to enforce on Liberia’s warlords, were largely 
futile (Adebajo 2002a:247).  
Fourth, had the regional organisation been able to uphold a united stance on the 
matter, it would most likely have increased the legitimacy of the operation at home as 
well as abroad. Maybe the warring groups, then, would have felt confronted with a more 
overwhelming opponent that could not be easily brushed aside. External support from 
major players such as the US, the EU and the UN would have been easier to acquire, as 
the agenda and motives of the intervening force would have been harder to question. 
One reason that the badly needed external assistance was disastrously late in arriving was 
the issue of certain contributing nations allegedly participating for reasons not entirely 
humanitarian, or even about regional security.    
One should expect that these complications could have been foreseen. On the 
other hand, the Anglophone countries may never have doubted their joint strength as 
they had no prior examples to tell them otherwise.  
 
The Regional Players  in  the  Somalia Conf l i c t  
In Somalia, the regional actors played a different role to the one in Liberia. The 
regional countries did not deploy peacekeeping forces to Somalia, as was the case in 
Liberia with ECOMOG. The foreign troops in Somalia were primarily from either the 
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UN or the US, though not entirely. The forces in Somalia displayed no local geopolitical 
objectives in the conflicting area (Adebajo 2003: 72). Somalia’s neighbouring states 
participated instead through peace conferences and trade.  
As with the external forces, the surrounding nations too had only limited 
experience in conflict resolution. Accordingly, some initiatives proved more effective 
than others. 
The conference held in Sodere, Ethiopia and the one in Cairo, Egypt both failed. It 
is difficult to accurately determine why the conferences failed,3 but critics have pointed to 
the fact that the two conferences opposed each other in their methods as well as in their 
choice of participants.  Sodere resorted to the building of blocks method, which implied 
recognition of Somaliland and Puntland. At the Cairo conference, however, neither was 
recognised as an autonomous republic, and they therefore declined the invitation (Farah 
2002: 11). 
One of the most significant conferences was the ARTA conference held in 
Djibouti. It resulted in the establishment of the Transitional National Government 
(TNG), which was generally regarded as an act of good will. A lesson from earlier 
conferences had been the need for a thorough preparation. Therefore the participants 
were given due time to engage in negotiations with the Djibouti government individually. 
This helped the delegates feel at ease at the conference (Farah 2002: 13).   
Critical voices from the regions of Somaliland and Puntland nevertheless pointed 
to legitimacy problems at the conference, though it was not the common perception. It 
was questionable, according to these voices, how the President in Djibouti could appoint 
twenty TNG members personally. Rightfully, it was not his within his authority. Despite 
these critiques, the conference ended with the appointment of an additional twenty seats 
to the TNG that were not originally planned for (Somaliawatch 2000). 
The peace conferences show different approaches to conflict resolution in Somalia, 
even though most were held by the regional organisation Inter-Governmental Authority 
for Development (IGAD). The dissimilarities, hence, indicate that the neighbouring 
countries were improvising as they went along and eventually used what they had learned 
from previous attempts. The last conference held in Kenya actually took notice of earlier 
errors as well as successes, and it succeeded in creating a formal government. In truth, 
the success was relative, but the achievements of the Kenya conference were more 
significant than had previously been the case (ICG 2004b).   
                                                
3 Even so, an attempt to clarify the reasons is made in the chapter ”Neutrality” 
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The Consequences of One-Sidedness  
As already alluded to above, Nigeria has been widely accused of abusing her own 
dominant position in the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia to favour her own 
aspirations as a regional hegemon by promoting a ‘Pax Nigeriana’ (Adebajo 2002a:241). 
Whatever the reasons for Nigerian dominance in ECOWAS/ECOMOG, it created a 
suspicion among some of the warring parties in Liberia concerning the role of the 
regional actor and its impartiality (Jaye 2003:141). Above all Taylor viewed the 
intervention as a Nigerian project to which he could not concede. The aversion to 
Nigerian influence in the region on the part of both Taylor and some members of 
ECOWAS was not new, but the deployment of ECOMOG with Nigeria in the leading 
role only exacerbated it. 
The problem of Nigeria’s impartiality will be addressed below, but Taylor’s 
discontent and animosity created a problem typical to the features of New Wars. Taylor 
saw ECOMOG as an invasion force, in spite of him not being the legitimate leader of 
Liberia. Taylor, however, did control most of the Liberian territory, which caused the 
peculiar situation that he and his quasi-state was the de facto holder of power in Liberia. 
Thus, ECOMOG was dealing with a whole new situation in which ECOWAS would 
have to decide with whom they should relate: the actual power holder or the president in 
Monrovia.  
It is hard to say to which extent Taylor’s resentment of Nigerian involvement in 
the Liberian conflict was a convenient excuse to oppose ECOMOG activity. Things 
were looking quite promising for NPFL at the time of the ECOMOG intervention. 
Chances are that the NPFL would have invaded Monrovia and toppled the Doe regime 
in a matter of weeks, had the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) that had been 
established by ECOWAS not decided it was time to act. Evidence of this can be deduced 
from the fact that it was Doe himself, hardly a staunch believer in outside interference in 
the business of his regime, who requested that ECOWAS came to the aid of the 
presiding government (Jaye 2003:146). Surely, he must have known that his time as 
Liberian ruler was nearing its end, and that if an external party did not intervene against 
the military progress of the NPFL, his own life would be in serious jeopardy.  
As it were, Taylor did have reason to be opposed to Nigeria. Babangida, the long-
time leader of Nigeria, had been a friend and supporter of Doe. Taylor had formerly 
served as chief of Liberia’s General Services Agency under Doe’s administration, but had 
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been accused of embezzlement after which he fled to the US (Adebajo 2002b:46). 
Perhaps it was partly old grudges and partly economic aspirations that spawned his desire 
for Liberian power. In any case, as Taylor knew of the close relationship between Doe 
and Babangida, he automatically regarded Nigeria as a threat to his efforts of confronting 
the Doe rule.  
Thus, the whole peace process came off to a very unfortunate beginning. As is 
common in New Wars, a proliferation of factions involving themselves in the fighting 
began. Taylor’s NPFL nevertheless remained the strongest and the one which most 
vividly opposed ECOMOG and the IGNU in Monrovia. It is therefore not unreasonable 
to argue that any attempt on creating peace in Liberia, negative as well as positive, was 
contingent upon the cooperation and goodwill of Taylor. If he did not accept the terms 
of peace, then no peace was possible. ECOMOG was spending most of its available 
resources and attention on fighting the NPFL. If Taylor could have been appeased, the 
other smaller factions emerging in the conflict would have posed a lesser challenge to 
ECOMOG. As long as the NPFL demanded most of the peacemakers’ attention, the 
smaller factions were free to roam. Thus, whether or not Nigeria’s intentions were 
indeed dishonest, the main opposing actor perceived them as such, claiming 
ECOMOG’s full attention.  
In a conflict within the realm of New Wars, a one-sided view of the actors can be 
decisive in the peace process. The number of actors engaged in such a conflict 
complicates the whole situation and, ultimately, the whole peace process. By focusing on 
the one, the others are left freehanded and uncontrolled. As it is likely that even the small 
factions to some extend benefit from the war, it is improbable that they will cease the 
fighting without the pressure of a mediator. This in mind, one could argue that 
ECOWAS disregarded the complexities of a New War, approaching the Liberian conflict 
in a Clausewitzean, more conventional way. However, other factors, like the aims of 
Nigeria, cannot be excluded from an analysis. This is dealt with below. 
In light of this, ECOWAS possibly would have done better to come up with an 
alternative solution to a monitoring force made up by 80% Nigerian troops in order to 
promote peace in the Liberian civil war. Bearing in mind the divisions on the matter 
within ECOWAS, and the somewhat limited military capacity of other individual states, 
the only sound solution probably would have been to acquire the involvement of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN sooner. This did not happen until the 
1993 Cotonou Agreement and the launching of the United Nations Observers Mission in 
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Liberia, UNOMIL. The UN deployment gave increased legitimacy to ECOMOG and 
lessened the feeling of Nigerian dominance. Taking into consideration the approach that 
the UN and the US had to the Liberian conflict, not getting actively involved and 
keeping their forces out of Liberia, there was no possibility for ECOWAS to accelerate 
UN engagement. On the contrary, UN encouraged regional responsibility. In hindsight, 
it was unlikely that ECOWAS would solve the conflict on their own, but the need for 
UN troops might not have been quite as clear to all then as it was later. After all, this was 
ECOWAS’s first peace-supporting intervention. 
 
The Deployment o f  UNOMIL 
The Liberian civil war featured an altogether new approach to peacekeeping 
missions. When the UN involved itself actively during the negotiation of the peace 
agreement signed in Cotonou in July of 1993, and in particular after, with the 
deployment of the UNOMIL observer mission, it was the first ever UN force engaged in 
a peacekeeping operation in collaboration with an already established regional force in 
the same area (Olonisakin 2003:112). The intervention by ECOWAS was likewise the 
first time a regional body initiated a peacekeeping mission without prior authorisation by 
the UN (Jaye 2003:3). This could be seen as a new model for dealing with intra-state 
conflicts in Africa, which received a stamp of approval by the UN. From the onset it 
was, thus, clear that ECOWAS was to take charge of the peace process in Liberia, while 
the UN was playing second fiddle, initially watching hesitantly in the background, but 
without subjecting ECOWAS’ initiatives to any critique.     
However, as this was a first-time experience for everyone, not everything went so 
smooth on the ground. ECOMOG had some difficulty in finding its own feet in Liberia. 
The course it eventually chose left it alternating between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement, diplomacy and military action to try and keep the parties to the conflict in 
check. Adding to this were the problems concerning both the lacking materials and 
logistics and the question of ECOMOG’s legitimacy as a peacekeeping actor. Logistics 
and legitimacy are exactly what UN ‘as the chief expression of the view of the ‘international 
community’’ can bestow on interventions by a regional organisation, while it also holds the 
necessary resources for the carrying out of such a mission (Jaye 2003:xv).  
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ECOWAS/UNOMIL Relat ions  
As the war continued and was getting still more violent, ECOMOG had found no 
way out of the deadlock with the NPFL or a way of curbing the aspirations of the new 
warlords. Not one peace agreement signed thus far had actually been implemented. 
These factors made peace enforcement the most frequently employed option. This was 
enhanced following Operation Octopus in the fall of 1992, when ECOMOG was 
submitted to full-scale attacks from NPFL forces aiming to take the capital. This made 
ECOMOG leaders realise that Taylor, more than any other warlord, had to be fought 
and pressured if peace were ever to become a reality in Liberia again (Adebajo 
2002b:55).4   
As a result of the above-mentioned circumstances, the only viable solution was to 
bring the OAU and the UN on to the Liberian stage to restore the image of the 
peacemaking parties and to salvage the peace process (Aning 1999:245). The OAU, 
however, although playing a gradually more active role, was impeded by limited financial 
and institutional capacity (Jaye 2003:1-2). The relationship of the two most significant 
peace promoters, ECOWAS and the UN, after the Cotonou Agreement in July 1993, had 
some problematic issues attached to it. The lack of precedence meant that both 
organisations were basically learning by doing. Coordination of activities was not always 
optimal, and ECOMOG troops found it hard to adjust to a new way of doing things as 
they had already been on the scene for three years. At the same time there was a feeling 
that UNOMIL only came to reap the fruits and the glory of ECOMOG’s hard-earned 
results (Jaye 2003:121).  
In the Cotonou accord the roles of ECOMOG and the UN observer mission, and 
the terms of collaboration, had been stated. The former was in charge of implementation 
of the agreed to disarmament and security, while the latter was monitoring the process. 
ECOMOG had an official peace enforcement mandate, which came, however, with 
some restrictions imposed by the UN (Olonisakin 2003:119).  
While the active UN participation did undoubtedly contribute to strengthen the 
authority and credibility of ECOMOG, to many, including Liberian civilians, the 
presence and actual purpose of the UN observers were less than obvious. First of all, the 
UN had been very late in getting involved in Liberia. The SMC had called on the UN to 
assist ECOWAS in its intervention back in 1990, but apparently to little avail (Jaye 
2003:146). Then, once the UN was finally in place and joining the peace initiatives, its 
                                                
4 See ”Neutrality” for further information. 
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efforts stood out as somewhat half-hearted and symbolical more than anything. There is 
no doubt that ECOWAS needed that symbolism, but on the ground the ECOMOG 
forces were still left with all the “dirty work”. In 1995, the UN had less than 100, 
unarmed peacekeepers present in Liberia and was relying completely on ECOMOG for 
security. UNOMIL was unable to significantly influence events as the peaceful 
environment that its mandate depended upon did not exist (Adebajo 2002a:248). The 
UN ‘simply monitored the regional actors doing the monitoring’ (Boulden 2003:306). The overall 
impression the UN observers gave of themselves and their strength and validity as a 
legitimate third party was hardly impressive. 
The questions remain, then, when the right moment for the UN to get actively 
involved in such a conflict would be, and to which degree it should involve itself? How 
should the roles of the regional body and the UN ideally be defined? There is little doubt 
that the UN must absolutely get involved, especially in a case like Liberia where the 
regional organisation suffered from both internal disagreements on the issue, as well as 
inadequate logistical and material resources, and, to make matters worse, it was 
confronted with continuing allegations of partiality. It was simply naïve under the 
circumstances to believe that ECOWAS could do the job on its own. Even if the 
advantages of a regional actor are many (Olonisakin 2003:111 -116), the Liberian case 
clearly demonstrates the need for on-time UN action alongside a regional actor to cast its 
political authority, its recognised legitimacy and its logistical apparatus behind the 
operation. 
 
The peace processes in Somalia and Liberia were clearly affected by the novelty of 
the conflicts and the resolution methods applied to them. The flaws differed in severity, 
and it cannot be argued that every fault is a consequence of the inexperience of the 
intervening parties. The new circumstances did, nevertheless, pose an additional 
challenge to both the UN and the regional actors. Had the right approach been found 
from the outset, things might have turned out differently. The fact is that the UN, 
ECOWAS and IGAD were all acting on unfamiliar ground and was learning from their 
flaws and successes as they went along.  
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Of Greed and Security – War Economy 
 
Having presented the inherent difficulties of intervening in the New Wars of 
Somalia and Liberia for peacekeeping actors such as the UN and regional organisations, 
and the collaboration between them, we will now turn our attention to the ways in which 
war economy has affected conflict resolution endeavours in the two civil wars in 
question. It is necessary to display in order to comprehend the difficulties the 
peacekeepers were facing, and to learn from the errors that were made in the process. 
The role of war economy in both conflicts cannot be exaggerated as it lies at the very 
foundation of the magnitude and length of the two wars.   
 
‘Clausewitz famously observed that war is ‘the pursuit of politics by other means’. David Keen 
has amended this, saying that ‘war is the pursuit of economics by other means’. More colloquially, 
a Soviet writer once characterized war as being fought for ‘freedom, or iron, or coal, or the devil 
knows what’ (Smillie 2002:1). 
 
Living under the Gun: War Economy in New Wars 
 War economy generally refers to the way armed fighting is financed and 
reinforced. Traditionally this has encompassed the means of production and the 
production itself. A conventional war is centrally financed, whereas in New Wars the 
financing itself is a feature. The financial support does not necessarily come from within 
the state, but can be donations from diasporas, trans-border trade, privatisation of 
security etc. The war economy in New Wars (henceforth war economy) can even be the 
very thing that fuels the strife. Fighting can be an object in itself, as the prolonging of the 
war can be a profit-generating factor in a war economy. Aid agencies are only now 
coming to realise “what generals have known since the dawn of history: that economics often lie at the 
heart of conflict, and […] that many benefit from it…” (Smillie 2002:1). 
In Somalia and Liberia warlords have been the dominant feature in the war 
economies. Their rationale of greed cannot be ignored. To understand their impact on 
the protracted nature of the conflicts, one must look at the war economy and its 
mechanisms. 
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The Charac t eri s t i c s  o f War Economy 
When a regular economy turns into a war economy, certain dramatic changes take 
place. In times of peace the economy is usually a developmental engine that works to the 
benefit of the country. But in civil wars, as the ones in Liberia and Somalia, the economy 
plays a somewhat different but equally important role that does not stimulate any 
development of the nation. The institutions which under peaceful conditions would 
provide sustainable national profit are replaced with institutions that provide for the 
necessities of the armed forces. The economy is made sustainable, not through an overall 
military victory, but through participation in and the prolonging and leeching of the war 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004:4). The wars in Somalia and Liberia are not conventional territorial 
wars in which the whole country is uniting against the one common enemy. In these civil 
wars there are numerous different actors interconnected by huge networks of interests, 
and therefore there is no one distinct enemy and no actor controlling the war economy. 
Civil war economy varies from traditional economy in that it is dominated by shadow 
activities. ‘War economy encompasses all activities relating to the illegal extraction, taxation and export 
of […] natural resources’ (Atkinson 1997:5). This was of course also the case in Liberia and 
Somalia. 
Though a war economy is not generating progress for everybody, it is still quite 
dynamic. It changes and adapts to the current situation which is constantly evolving. It 
includes numerous opportunities for anyone with the right entrepreneurial spirit, ranging 
from exploitation of natural resources to the extortion from aid organisations. The 
opportunities of generating profit in both legal and illegal ways change with the mode of 
the war itself. This factor will become evident if the war economy in conflicts within the 
New Wars framework is analysed. Due to this dynamic nature of war economy, the 
Somali ‘currency is stable and the economy is widely regarded as expanding’ even though Somalia is 
torn by war (Duffield 1999:4).   
The war economy is entirely different from what one would regard as a “normal” 
economy, but similarities can still be found. The market mechanisms are still functioning 
and help to define the possibilities of trade at any given time. Even if the state 
institutions have imploded, the optimism of the commercial community will not falter. 
There are no regulations. The competition is very healthy for the business and for the consumers’ 
(Duffield 1999:4). War economy in New Wars remains a functioning organism from 
which participating parties can benefit (Duffield 1999:4). This contrasts with a “normal” 
war economy, when the economic engine is used not to serve the greed of a participant, 
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but to finance the great technological military machine. In fact, it is harder to see where 
New Wars war economy differs from a simple “normal” economy (as opposed to 
“normal” war economy). This has to do with the variety of factors inherent in the 
former. 
 
Making Prof i t  in  the  Liberian and Somali  Conf l i c t s  
In the civil wars of Liberia and Somalia, insecurity is omnipresent. These countries 
have been devastated by years of armed conflict, and warlords control various parts of 
the countries. These warlords are constantly fighting each other, almost indiscriminately. 
The bloody rivalries between the various factions and the reality of civilian targets in the 
New Wars create a chaotic environment and a security dilemma for the populations. The 
chaotic environment in turn encourages illicit business activities and other forms of 
crime. As the warlords clash, both the security dilemma and the crime rates are affected. 
In addition, the countries are swarming with arms. In 1999 it was estimated that almost 
every household in Somalia had a weapon (Duffield 2001:171). In a regular market place 
in Somalia it is possible to buy weapons, often small arms, that are easy to handle and 
transport (Grosse-Kettler 2004:24). The combination of chaos as normalcy, crime, 
fighting warlords, intimidated warlords and easy access to weapons is potentially a highly 
dangerous situation. In failed or collapsed states there are no institutions that can or will 
thwart this environment created partly by the warlords being free to do as they please.  
The ensuing widespread feeling of insecurity along with a natural craving for 
security has proven to be a lucrative business for the warlords. For a less than modest 
sum of money they will provide the wanted protection. This applies to wealthy people as 
well as everyone else who cannot challenge their strength.  
Local individuals, however, are not the only ones in need of security. When the 
Bank of Barakaak opened in Mogadishu in 1997, one third of the employees were 
security personnel (Duffield 2001:172). This goes to show the magnitude of the security 
sector and how far-reaching it is. The concept of protection money is, of course, not 
confined to New Wars and Warlords, but the extent of the security sector in these 
particular conflicts is immense. Even international aid organisations, working for the 
survival of others, have to secure their personnel by buying security from the warlords.  
Security is a basic need of all human beings. Naturally, in cases like the Somali and 
Liberian conflicts, people with the means to do so will pay a fair amount of protection 
money to fulfil this basic need. Common business sense would require that the richer the 
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payer is, the higher the price. Accordingly, whenever international trade adds to the 
enrichment of a Liberian or Somali businessman, a certain share of this money is likely to 
be used to pay for continued security. By these means, all trade with businessmen from 
either country is potentially to the advantage of a warlord and helps prolong the war 
indirectly through protection tariffs (Grosse-Kettler 2004:2). 
Profits are also collected through control of the infrastructural elements such as 
harbours, airports, markets or even bridges. Infrastructure is vital for trade, food 
deliveries and more. Much of the fighting between warlords is for the control of these 
profit-accumulating areas. Since they are this important to the society as a whole and to 
the wealthiest traders in the country, it is possible for the warlords to demand a security 
fee or tax for the safe passage of goods. Even if stealing, producing and selling should 
amount to a considerable income, security remains an important industry in a war 
economy. Especially in Somalia where, contrary to in Liberia, there are very few natural 
resources to sell, the primary income-generating sector is in fact security (Grosse-Kettler 
2004:15). 
 
Economic  Motivat ion  
Insecurity and easy access to weapons are preconditions for a smooth war 
economy that can be used by warlords to garner resources. This is why the motivation 
for such a war tends to be confusing, as it strays from the logic of conventional war: The 
main objective is not necessarily the final victory over one’s foe, but can easily be the 
participation itself in the war and the dissemination of insecurity, with the sole purpose 
of profit, i.e. greed. As long as the fighting causes instability the warlords will 
continuously enrich themselves through providing security.  
This leaves the countries in a situation virtually without development. Where 
sustainable development should take place, be it a geographical area or a certain sector, 
the development is halted by the individual interest of the warlords. Revenue that should 
have been recycled instead enriches the warlords. The warlords are the primary authority, 
and their intention is to pursue further personal gain, not to govern the people. They 
have no interest in developing ‘a broader project of creating a state that serves a collective good or 
even creating institutions that are capable of developing independent perspectives and acting on behalf of 
interests distinct from the rulers’ personal exercise of power’ (Reno 1998:1).    
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Generat ing Prof it   
 The common perception is that along with war come heavy expenses for the 
warring parties, due to casualties, lost territories, destroyed infrastructure, military 
expenses, arms, transportation of soldiers and equipment etc. As mentioned above, this 
was not the case for the warlords in either Liberia or Somalia. They took advantage of 
the dynamics of war by making these work for them, not against them. Warlords in the 
two countries have shown an astonishing ability to adapt to the globalised world order by 
trading with foreign investors across territorial borders while bypassing these as well as 
moral ones. Most trade is done through illegal networks between the parties in the wars 
and the surrounding countries, although the networks do not officially exist. 
Furthermore, these illicit networks stretch all over the world, even into the heart of the 
European Union, as when Italian and Swiss firms without national government 
recognition dumped their waste on Somali territory. The contracts were seemingly signed 
with warlords. Since Somalia has little natural waste themselves, the business is thought 
to be very lucrative indeed for the warlords (Grosse-Kettler 2004:28-29; Duffield 
2001:176). 
The legality of the grey zone in which the warlords operate when trading with 
foreign countries is questionable at best. The sale of goods to the Western world is at 
first sight legal, since it is done in the open and through legal firms. The business 
becomes questionable when focusing at other levels in society, for instance at the meso 
level: the production of commodities. Plantations can e.g. be run by local faction leaders 
who violate human rights by using forced labour. Thus, the trade itself is legal, whereas 
the production is not, at least not on the international level. At macro level the trade can 
cause illegal taxes on goods (Atkinson 1997:5). Both examples, though, are contingent 
upon the approach. Warlords who are in control of a certain area are likely to define the 
law. So, from their point of view nothing illegal has taken place. From an international 
point of view, however, the rules of trade or human rights might have been violated in 
the process. Thus, whether or not to support these actions is in most cases the choice of 
the company doing the trading with the warlord. 
 
For many years, governments and firms worldwide ignored the consequences of 
purchasing natural resources from Liberia. Two commodities in particular were dealt in 
illicit ways to the benefit of the seller and the buyer, not the people of Liberia, namely 
diamonds and timber (Smillie 2002). 
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When Charles Taylor in 1989 first invaded Liberian ground from The Ivory Coast, 
he soon realised that the road to Monrovia would be long. As a consequence, he engaged 
in a war attrition financed by the resources of lands that he controlled. He plundered 
diamonds, timber, rubber and everything else with a profit. He even got his hands on 
Sierra Leonean diamonds, as he had already made friends with the rebel leader. The two 
warlords now helped each other (Smillie 2002:2-3).  
In the 1990s Belgium was one of the largest buyers of Liberian diamonds. In the 
years 1994-1999 Belgium purchased $US 2.2 billions worth of Liberian diamonds, not 
once asking how a devastated country like Liberia could produce such an amount of 
rough diamonds (Smillie 2002:3). Conflict diamonds was put on the international agenda 
in 1998 following a conference on their importance to the rebel forces in Angola.  
However, even after the issue had come to the attention of the masses, Liberia 
continued to sell diamonds. Diamonds are not coveted in Africa, so the sale had to take 
place outside of the African continent (Smillie 2002:4). Governments in the purchasing 
countries made earnings from the taxes on the diamonds, and the companies made 
considerable revenues. Thus, all involved in the trade profited from the illicit diamonds. 
The population of Liberia was the evident looser in the game. Not only was the 
diamonds stolen from them and the money the diamonds collected placed on warlord 
bank accounts, but the very same money was also used to buy the weapons with which 
they were subsequently killed (Smillie 2002:6). Not until 2001 were sanctions placed on 
Liberians diamonds along with an arms embargo. Even so, the international community 
could not agree on a way to authenticate the origins of the diamonds. 
Having earned billions of dollars on diamonds, thereby financing the continuation 
of the war, Taylor eventually found his income decreased by the sanctions and embargos. 
He suspended his support to the Sierra Leonean rebel army, which caused their retreat 
and the end of the Sierra Leonean diamond flow (Smillie 2002:9). 
Taylor then turned his main focus to timber trade. At the peak of Taylor’s rule, he 
was the third largest supplier of timber to France and one of the largest suppliers to 
China. The Taylor Government taxed the export heavily, making a vast amount of 
money. The taxes, however, were not passed on to the Liberian people. The estimated 
$US 400 million that the timber export brought Taylor per year were deposited in a 
Burkinabe bank account. Later Taylor made use of them to fund the trade of illegal 
weapons (Reno 1998:97). As with the diamonds, the international firms as well as the 
purchasing governments abroad denied the link between the continued war, weapons 
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and timber (Smillie 2002:11). Thus, Taylor was able to finance his army through illicit 
trade indirectly supported by firms and governments in denial of the bloody 
consequences of their trade. 
  
In Somalia very few natural resources exist. Therefore much trade has been reliant 
upon agricultural products. Somalia does not have as valuable trading options as Liberia, 
so the warlords created their profit in other ways than trading. 
 In the early 1990s, about 6000 hectares of land were covered with banana 
plantations. The banana companies Sombana and Somalfruit exported bananas to both 
the US and Italy. Through 1994 to 1997, the competition between the two firms 
intensified into what is referred to as the Banana War. In the same period heavy fighting 
took place in Somalia. As everyone else, the firms were affected by the fighting, causing 
them a security problem which also reached their Western business partners. The 
problem was solved through an agreement with General Aideed. The simple solution 
was a security tax placed on the bananas. The agreement enabled General Aideed to 
finance his militia up until 1996 when the US banana business partners left the Somali 
banana venture due to high transport and security expenses (Grosse-Kettler 2004:16).   
Though bananas were among the few things worth exporting in Somalia, they were 
not the only things in need of security. In 1992 the international community, represented 
by the UN mission UNOSOM, stepped onto the Somali scene. The intention was to 
intervene in the conflict between the warlords with the objective of easing the horrifying 
situation for the people of Somalia. The chaotic state of the country combined with 
drought had caused starvation, and UNOSOM was to secure the delivery of aid to the 
famished masses. By the summer of 1992, one and a half million Somalis were internally 
displaced and the food situation was catastrophic. The lower provinces had a 90 percent 
malnutrition rate and a 16.5 death rate among the displaced persons (Prunier 1996:7). 
The primary goal of UNOSOM was to improve conditions for the famished Somalis. 
But as it turned out, the warlords had their share of the aid also. ‘According to estimates that 
vary extensively, namely between 10 and 80 percent of all international supplies were looted in October 
1992’ (Grosse-Kettler 2004:11).  
The warlord annexation of relief aid had unforeseen consequences. It opened the 
way for the emergence of a parallel economy in which aid became the currency. This 
type of parallel economy can only emerge when the state institutions are failing (Smillie 
2002:4-5). With the aid in the possession of the warlords it came in short supply. What 
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happened was that the warlords looted the aid, sold it in the market, which was close to 
the only place it was available, and bought arms for the money they earned. The arms 
intensified the instability and security dilemmas which amplified the security business, 
thus completing the circle.  
As a consequence of the growing instability, the aid workers from the international 
organisations and the international traders needed continued security, which they bought 
from the warlords, as these were the only ones capable of offering it (Grosse-Kettler 
2004:11-12). Even though it was never the intention of UNOSOM, this vicious circle 
aggravated the conflict. It is fair to presume that they expected some quantity of the aid 
to be lost or stolen, but it is unlikely that they foresaw what in fact happened. The 
international aid organisations as well as the UN must have expected a certain amount of 
the food supplies to actually reach the staving people in Somalia.  
In an effort to counter the problems of securing the delivery humanitarian aid, the 
United Task Force (UNITAF), the US-led mission under UN auspice to follow 
UNOSOM, cooperated with the warlords. Not only did UNITAF seek warlord approval 
and protection for delivering aid, the warlords had moreover developed a highly 
sophisticated way of siphoning finances from UNITAF and its personnel. The buildings 
in which the UN personnel worked and lived were situated on premises owned by 
prominent faction leaders. The office guards, convoy guards, and drivers, all employed 
by the UNITAF, were selected by the local armed factions. Therefore they had to pay 
part of what they earned to the local warlord. ‘Thus, on many occasions when fighting did occur 
during that period, it was because of quarrels over UNITAF spoils. UNITAF unwittingly became the 
main financer and equipment provider (through massive theft) for the warlords’ (Prunier 1996:9). 
The eventual withdrawal of international forces and organisations had an obvious 
effect on the parallel economy. It became all to clear what role these actors had played in 
the Somali conflict. Before the intervention a bloody war in Mogadishu had demanded 
300,000 lives and led to the almost complete destruction of the city. At that time, the 
warlords were fighting for the leftovers of Siad Barre’s regime, with an aim to fill the 
power vacuum left when he was ousted. This led to the perception that when the 
international peacekeeping forces left, the bloody war would once again erupt and claim 
an even larger number of lives. As it turned out, when the international forces and relief 
organisations eventually left there were no resources left to fight over. Surprisingly, this 
led to a rough sort of peace or a state of non-violence in Mogadishu and in the rest of 
Somalia. ‘With the departure of UNOSOM, the strength of the factions immediately weakened. 
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UNOSOM money had been their financial base. They were now left with the prospect of either fighting 
wildly among themselves over diminishing resources or establish some kind of mutually acceptable way of 
doing business’ (Prunier 1996:9).  
 
The rationale of greed is what potentially turns everything into a business. The 
warlords are indifferent to the suffering of people as long as it does not influence with 
their possibilities of making a profit. In fact, they do not hesitate to exploit suffering, as 
e.g. the appropriation of relief aid. They are primarily guided by greed, and the war is the 
way to satisfy this greed through the means shown above. Even if the presentation is not 
exhaustive it does show that warlords have no incentive to end the war, but rather to 
prolong it.  
The extent of their greed and willingness to exploit every option may have 
surprised the international intervening parties and mediators in both Somalia and Liberia. 
The war economy has proven profitable to the warlords, and this must be regarded when 
dealing with warlords, since war and war economy are interdependent. Even if the 
mediators and peacemakers in Somalia and Liberia were aware of the influence of the 
war economy, they did not pay enough heed to these dynamic mechanisms. If so, the 
UN, e.g., should have learned more during the three missions in Somalia than to be 
surprised by their own role in fuelling the conflict.    
Warlords and the complicating factor that they constitute is very much an aspect to 
reckon with when dealing with a New War. 
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Warlords – Cooperation and Legitimacy 
 
Handling an armed conflict in which warlords are fighting each other over access 
to and control with resources is a relatively new situation for the international 
community. This is evident when looking at the Somali and Liberian conflicts of the 
1990s. In the following we will seek to describe the critical problems that arose when the 
peacemaking actors in the two countries in mention tried to cope with the warlord 
regimes and the complex choices that had to be made, for better or worse. The nature of 
a warlord, it was learned, is one of deceit and unpredictability. Unfortunately, certain 
initiatives by the international community proved to have a rather counteractive effect.     
 
Complexities Involving Warlords in Conflict Intervention  
It is often argued that the ones responsible for the violence are the same ones who 
have to end the violence. Hence, in contemporary conflicts, as the ones in Somalia and 
Liberia, the prevailing interventional approach applied by the international community 
has been to negotiate with the warlords. In order to achieve sustainable peace the 
warlords must be recognised as the most dominant and influential parties to the conflict. 
Cooperation with warlords has been practised in both the Somali and Liberian conflicts 
in order to restore peaceful and sustainable conditions. The rationale behind this 
approach to New Wars is that the international community has to avoid fuelling the 
conflict further, which a disregard of the warlords would cause. By cooperating with 
them, the intervening actors can hope to avoid the warlords’ opposition to their presence 
and mission (Kaldor 1999:119). Fundamental to this approach is that the warlords are 
crucial to the peacemaking. Nevertheless, this approach is questionable. 
 
The Public Legitimacy of Warlords  
The negotiation and cooperation with warlords has proven to contain several 
disadvantages. When holding peace talks with warlords, these warlords gain legitimacy 
and their authority as leaders is officially confirmed. The global media plays a central role 
in this when it displays images of international negotiators shaking hands with warlords. 
Furthermore, many warlords are accused of war crimes and perceived as such by the 
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masses (Kaldor 1999:120). Even so, international intervening actors choose to negotiate 
with them. This is a paradox.  
Public broadcasting of the peace talks and negotiations can, thus, lead to a de facto 
legitimising of the warlords, especially if the talks are arranged by regional or 
international organisations. This happened during the talks between the Somali warlords 
General Aideed and Sergeant Mahdi concerning the division of Mogadishu shortly after 
the arrival of US troops in Somalia, December 1992 (Kaldor 1999:119). The two of them 
were responsible for the death of 30.000-50.000 (Thomashausen 2002:56) persons during 
the fight for Mogadishu, but in the peace talks they nevertheless gained recognition as 
official power holders (Kaldor 1999:123). The international community had no option 
but to address someone in order to negotiate peace, since peace talks cannot be initiated 
without local representation, and in Somalia’s case the real power holders, the factions, 
did not hold any traditional authority. Rather, the leaders had seized the power over the 
clan. Therefore the faction leaders are primarily warlords rather than traditional leaders 
(ICG 2004: 16-17).  
At top level, communication tends to have a horizontal character, as leaders 
generally talk to other leaders. This is complicated in failed and collapsed states like 
Liberia and Somalia where legitimate power is absent. The organisations intervening thus 
face a serious problem: When no legitimate power is present, who should be consulted? 
In both the present cases the intervening actors have turned to another sort of key actor 
in the conflicts, the warlords. Thus, the warlords became central actors in the peace 
negotiations, but also in humanitarian projects as the humanitarian relief assistance 
launched by UNOSOM in Somalia 1992 (McDonald 2001:52). This approach had the 
unintended side effect that it empowered the warlords. As a result of this the warlords 
became representatives of the population. The approach of negotiating with warlords 
indicates that ‘citizens can´t make peace’ (Kaldor 1999:122).  
 
The Cooperation with Warlords  
 
Somali  Warlords   
Following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, escalating clan warfare, 
widespread banditry as well as a very long drought left Somalia facing a severe 
humanitarian crisis. ‘By the end of 1991, more than 4.5 million people had been displaced as refugees, 
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and more than 300,000 Somalis had died of starvation’ (Celeski 2002:1). In 1992, the crisis 
attracted the attention of the international media by bringing images of victims of war 
and famished Somalis. To begin with the UN intervention in Somalia provided food and 
relief to the war-torn country, but the ceasefire on 3 March 1992 led to the establishment 
of UNOSOM, the first UN operation in Somalia.  
The main focus of UNOSOM was to monitor the ceasefire and secure the delivery 
of humanitarian relief. But the initial force of 50 observers and later the additional 500 
peacekeepers failed to deter fighting between the warlords. Furthermore, the warlords 
became increasingly emboldened and began to obstruct the UN mission. The warlords 
hindered the relief distribution by plundering the convoys and thereby threatening the 
safety of both UN and relief organisation personnel. When violent fighting broke out 
around agricultural areas in Baydhabo and Jubba, the humanitarian catastrophe grew 
even worse. The UN faced severe problems and the ceasefire monitoring was not at all 
efficient (Farah 2002:8). As a response to the difficulties, UNITAF was launched, 
assisted by the American Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF was a US-led mission 
under the auspice of UN and it had the task of establishing a secure environment for the 
distribution of humanitarian aid. Operation Restore Hope was to actually deliver the aid. 
The relative success of this operation is said to be because of the cooperation with 
warlords (Farah 2002: ibid). This approach reduced the violent confrontations with the 
warlords, but it also had negative effects. 
‘This confrontationshy approach reinforced the invincibility of the notorious faction leaders, boosted 
their sagging morale and image as political leaders of their respective clans and therefore gave them 
unwarranted legitimacy. It also set a negative precedent as it impaired subsequent efforts seeking factional 
reconciliation and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations’ (Farah 2002: ibid). 
In 1993 UNITAF had, according to the Americans, completed its mission and was 
replaced by the partly state-building UN mission UNOSOM II (McDonald 2001:55+63). 
The US had no state-building intentions and insisted that UNITAF was merely 
humanitarian. The UNOSOM I and UNITAF missions saved thousands of lives, but 
they did not overcome the violence in the country. First of all because their primary aim 
was to deliver humanitarian aid, while disarming the warring factions was only the 
secondary objective. In order to carry out its task UNITAF cooperated with warlords, 
which only boosted the internal status and capacity of the latter. The US approach was 
pragmatic and simply recognised the existing power realities. It was viewed as necessary 
in order to avoid confrontation with the warlords.  
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UNITAF only lasted six months, which is too short a period to establish peace, 
had that even been the objective (Mockaitis 1999:8). The fact that UNITAF had done 
nothing to obtain peace or disarm the factions turned out to be a critical obstacle to 
UNOSOM II. They had a mandate to enforce peace, but fewer troops to do this with 
than UNITAF, who had consisted primarily of potent American units (Mockaitis 
1999:10).  
This factor became crucial on 5 June 1993 when General Aideed’s faction, the 
SNA, killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at Radio Mogadishu, apparently partly to test the 
strength and resilience of UNOSOM II.5 The following tension between the UN and the 
SNA empowered Aideed’s main opponent, the warlord Mahdi.  
Mahdi was the better diplomat of the two and moreover surrounded by people 
used to dealing with higher level negotiators. Thus, he kept his relations to the 
international forces at a friendly level. This aggravated the conflict between him and 
Aideed, the latter believing that the UN was creating a protectorate. Mahdi, on the other 
hand, benefited from this dispute since it weakened his opponent (Hausen 2002:70; 
Prunier 19-20).  
The fact that the tension between Aideed and Mahdi was worsened by the UN 
indicates how problematic dealing with warlords can be. Earlier on the UN had 
cooperated with General Aideed in order to deliver humanitarian aid. Now, he turned on 
them, causing the eruption of a regular war. UNOSOM II was not originally mandated to 
go after General Aideed, but the attack on UN soldiers forced them to request the arrest 
of the responsible party, namely Aideed.   
The UN had formerly cooperated with Aideed, whereas they now put a price on 
his head, as it were. The international community did not succeed in catching General 
Aideed though. Instead the mission resulted in a tragic incident when the war culminated 
in Mogadishu with the killing of eighteen American soldiers. In the American media, 
pictures of the bodies of American soldiers being dragged through the streets were 
shown. Following this, the US and UN troops withdrew. The estimated casualties in the 
war were between 500 and 1000 dead (Thomashausen 2002:56).  
During the UNITAF period, the UN was criticised for shying confrontation by not 
meddling in the business of the warlords, and for distributing aid through the 
cooperation with them. The later intense battles with warlords under UNOSOM II 
indicate that the cooperation with warlords was only up to a certain point. It appears that 
                                                
5 This event is examined in the chapter ”Neutrality” 
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as soon as Aideed had a prospect of losing power, fighting broke out. His version of 
what happened was that he was fighting to avoid the re-imperialising of Somalia by the 
UN, which contrasts completely with the statements of the UN (Prunier 1996:20). The 
goal of the United Nations was to de-escalate the conflict by disarmament of the 
warlords and destruction of weapons. This could have been possible under UNITAF, 
but at that point the cooperation with the warlords was more important in order to 
secure the delivery of aid. It is difficult to say whether the dealing with the warlords 
during the UNITAF period made more difficult the later disarmament during the 
UNOSOM II period. One thing is certain though, the relationship with the warlords 
changed dramatically. In dealing with warlords the international community seems to 
have made a compromise between the use of massive power and doing nothing at all, 
both solutions being narrow and short-term solutions.   
 
The cooperation with warlords has taken a new turn following the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, which led to the War on 
Terror and the international hunt for terrorists. The United States has become 
increasingly aware of Somalia. The collapsed nature of the state is viewed as an excellent 
recruiting ground and safe haven for terrorists. This has led to a new form of 
cooperation with the Somali warlords, in which they are paid by the US government to 
fight factions suspected of relations to al-Qaeda (Lacey 2006:2). The earlier hesitation to 
support warlords has been replaced by a yearning to catch all involved with Osama bin 
Laden. The central issue now is to eliminate supposed terrorists whereas other issues, 
such as the effect cooperation with warlords might have, are widely disregarded. ‘The 
warlords, who say they have joined America's fight against terrorism, are calling themselves the Alliance 
for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism. They are led by Mohammed Deere, Mohammed 
Qanyare and Bahire Rageh, all powerful figures in Mogadishu.. (Lacey 2006:3). In chasing 
terrorists the US is once again providing the warlords with legitimacy. It contradicts the 
common perception of warlords as unreliable criminals, not to be cooperated with. 
 
Liberian Warlords   
The international community, ECOWAS aside, played an entirely different role in 
Liberia. It was not as visible as it was in Somalia. Indirect support or sanctions were 
more frequently applied methods in Liberia than actual UN intervention.  
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After Charles Taylor eventually was elected President of Liberia in 1997, the 
international community expressed dissatisfaction with the political development in 
Liberia. Their arguments were that clear evidence existed of Taylor’s support to the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel unit causing devastation in Sierra Leone. 
When RUF launched their attack on Sierra Leone, it was done from Liberia with the 
support of Taylor. Besides, he sold the unit weapons in return for rough diamonds 
(Smillie 2002:3).6   Though he was an elected president, his reign was one of suppression 
and misrule and he caused a severe humanitarian crisis in both Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Adebajo 2003:80). The international community, e.g. the US and the EU, reacted to this 
by isolating Taylor. All aid was suspended and all trade banned. These sanctions 
weakened Taylor, but they also had a harsh impact on the general standard of living in 
Liberia. The years the sanctions were imposed saw the highest death rates during the 
entire rule of Taylor (Bøås 2005:84).  
As could be expected in a failed state, Taylor’s rule was repressive and his political 
practice was based on fear. Taylor had a lot of enemies inside Liberia, who, during 
Taylor’s first period as president, were disorganised and fragmented. The only thing they 
had in common was their opposition to Taylor. Thus their agenda was to remove Taylor 
from power through military means rather than political (Bøås 2005:ibid). That Taylor’s 
opponents eventually united against him can be seen as a side-effect of the sanctions; due 
to the sanctions he did not have the adequate power to counter the rebel groups that 
were growing stronger.  Of these factions the two most powerful were Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), which was primarily seen as a political 
projection of the Mandingo ethnic group, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL), formed by leaders of another ethnic group, the Krahn (Bøås 2005:83-86). 
Both groups had been supporters of the Doe regime and had fought Taylor before he 
rose to power. 
The weakened Taylor was not able to eliminate the opposing factions and they 
were increasingly becoming a threat to him. Due to the economic sanctions and the strict 
surveillance on Taylor and his regime, it became ever more difficult for him to continue 
his warfare against MODEL and LURD. These two factions were not targeted by similar 
sanctions and surveillance, which enabled them to strengthen their positions and restock 
their military capacity while Taylor was losing his capacity.  
                                                
6 On conflict diamonds, see ”War Economy” 
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The international environment is interesting when speaking of LURD’s and 
MODEL’s strengthening. The Guinean president, Lasana Conte, was from a clan related 
to the Mandingos and he accordingly supported LURD, in particular with military 
capacity. At the time Guinea was a major recipient of aid from the United States, some 
of which were transferred to LURD as financial support of the army (Bøås 2005: 85) 
Hence the US, knowingly or not, provided financial support to LURD while the 
international community tightened its grip on Taylor.  
MODEL’s support from the Ivorian president was very similar to the support 
offered to LURD by the Guinean president. The Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, was 
at this time convinced that Taylor supported rebel groups in his country. He therefore 
allowed the MODEL to establish bases along the border to Liberia (Bøås 2005 85-86). 
Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the bases from the Ivorian army. But the 
supplies had originally been given to the Ivorian army by France as military assistance. In 
that way the international community indirectly supported LURD and MODEL and 
contributed to their endeavours.  
Taylor was forced to fight the two factions that had gradually gained more capacity 
while his own regime suffered from strong economical pressure. All this in the end led to 
Taylor fleeing to Nigeria in August 2003, and a new National Transitional Government 
could be established to which the representatives had been nominated by LURD and 
MODEL.  
The fact that the international community pressured Taylor in the last stages of the 
Liberian war, and the fact that it proved effective, indicates that economic and political 
sanctions are efficient tools to impose in a conflict. The blocking of all sources of 
finance, and supporting his opponents caused Taylor to give in. His way of financing the 
whole war was founded on trade with the surrounding world, and when this became 
impossible for him, he could not sustain his oppressive regime. But a sanction approach 
does not guarantee peace; in this case it only ensured that the dictator was removed. The 
cooperation with warlords from LURD and MODEL definitely raises a lot of issues. 
One could ask whether it is possible to create positive peace in a situation in which the 
international community has given indirect support to individual factions build on 
groupings? There are no assurances that such factions will not just imitate the repressive 
regime, only this time towards other groups, especially when bearing in mind that 
regimes like Taylor’s can indeed be a very profitable business. In fact, some argue that 
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the ‘(…) only thing that can prevent the Liberian war from restarting is a thorough international 
engagement with Liberia(…)’ (Bøås 2005:87).  
In the case of Liberia, placing sanctions on Taylor, while at the same time indirectly 
supporting his opponents actually brought about a solution to the war. However, in a 
war controlled by warlords, pinning one down releases the others. Some would argue 
that indirect support to suspicious persons by the internal community is a dubious way to 
promote peace. In addition, the combined consequences of threats, suspension of aid 
and economic sanctions can mean identifying new leaders (Kaldor 1999). In this case the 
sanctions isolated Taylor, but at the same time they identified new leaders from the 
LURD and the MODEL. It remains to be seen whether the new government will have 
any interest in doing non-exclusive politics when the international community no longer 
monitors the national military, economic and political leaders. Nevertheless, so far the 
approach of supporting the factions that oppose the stronger warlord has proved the 
lesser of two evils, and has actually resulted in some sort of negative peace. 
 
Negotiating with the Warlords 
Who Is  Represen t ing Whom? 
From comprehensive reading on the warlords’ actions and positions in as well 
society as war, it can be understood that a warlord is the self-appointed leader of a clan. 
When the clan is threatened by other clans an opportunistic person emerges and leads 
the rest of the clan. The warlord then is a strongman who obtains his legitimacy in the 
clan from his superior fighting skills and his ability to lead soldiers into battle. The 
warlord’s aim is not only survival of the clan, but typically also improvement of the 
economic position of the clan, and himself. The warlord is not chosen through a 
consensual decision. Neither does he have the traditional authority of the elders. He 
merely emerges out of the need for an able leader in wartime. Though holding the 
traditional authority, the elders cannot compete with the warlords and their means. 
(Grosse-Ketteler 2004, ICG 2003) 
‘In much of southern Somalia, the authority of the elders is no longer an effective counterweight to 
the financial and military clout of faction leaders or their private sector backers. Many political 
leaders are often able to defy traditional leaders, or have simply become adapt at manipulating the 
elders through political and financial influence’ (ICG 2004:16).  
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This means that the one representing a group is the strongest man, who has been 
the most successful in promoting himself. It is doubtful whether this person, this 
warlord, is capable of representing the common good of the clan. As already mentioned, 
the warlords are first and foremost businessmen, and it is questionable whether they can 
be trusted to represent the people as they lack political ideology, and are driven by greed 
alone (Grosse-Kettler 1996:2). It is problematic that when the international community 
holds peace talks with the aim of establishing a government, it is the warlords who are 
negotiated with. It seems that in most attempts at establishing a government, the 
warlords have gained a prominent position. But a logical look at this approach reveals 
that by giving them these prominent positions, all that is achieved is that the strongest 
men most willing to promote themselves will be ruling the country. It has been seen time 
and again how the faction leaders continued their fight for resources from within the 
new governments.  
‘Past Somali peace initiatives have encouraged the perception of central government as a “cake” – 
a source of revenue to enrich those with access to it. Somali political leaders have thus devoted all their 
energies to the carefully negotiated dividing up of positions in a government by clan rather than address 
the main substantive issues related to the actual administration of the country and reconciliation’ (ICG 
2002: 27). 
The Puntland Government in a press release prior to the ARTA conferences asked 
how such a government consisting of war criminals can be legitimate (Somaliwatch 2000) 
A question that can be followed by another important question: Why do the 
governments consist of warlords who are chosen for their skills in battle, and not leaders 
that are chosen for their abilities to govern people? These questions will be addressed in 
the following section. 
 
Who i s  the  Leader? 
When the international community has to commence the peace process, it will first 
have to navigate through the chaos that is a New War. There are factions fighting each 
other everywhere with ever-changing alliances. In Somalia, the USC branch, which was 
one of the leading factions behind the ousting of Siad Barre, was suddenly divided into 
two sections; one led by Mahdi and one by Aideed. In this case, it was extremely difficult 
for the UN to identify which branch was leading which (ICG ???). To decide who to 
negotiate with within a clan can likewise be troubling. As explained above, a warlord is 
not always holding traditional authority in peace talks, but he is the most obvious to 
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address. If the warlords are the ones prolonging the conflict they must be the ones to 
end it (Kaldor 1999: 120).  
 
The Choi c e  
In the intra-state New Wars of Africa it is difficult to establish peace without the 
warlords. They are the most obvious authorities, though not legitimate, and have the 
superior strength. If a peace process is commenced without their acceptance they are 
likely to counteract through sabotage or plain denunciation. The reason is that a peace 
process threatens their position as leaders, because they lack a legit foundation for their 
rule. During times of peace it would be difficult for them to uphold their regime of fear 
and hatred.  
‘Since the power of the warring parties depends largely on fear and/or self-interest and not on 
consent, they need an insecure environment to sustain themselves both politically and economically. 
Politically, identity is based on fear and hatred of the other; economically, revenues depend on (…) 
loot and extortion or on price distortions resulting from restrictions on freedom of movement. In 
peace times these sources of sustenance are eroded’ (Kaldor 1999:120).  
Their profit too is contingent upon the instability of the situation which allows for 
illicit businesses and commercialisation of security. Hence, peace talks that do not 
include the warlords are a direct threat to their positions, and they will be very likely to 
oppose it.   
As stated above, these strongmen claimed power over their clans without regard to 
the wishes of these clans and are as such not legitimate representatives. When the 
international community negotiates with them, it de facto legitimises their claim as 
representatives of a group over which they have no legitimate authority. They become 
legitimised leaders both towards their own clan and outwards to the rest of the world. In 
the end, this could lead to governments consisting of war criminals and self-appointed 
leaders. A taxi driver from Mogadishu commented on this very problem in relation to the 
UN negotiations between Aideed and Mahdi in 1992:  
‘Everyone agrees that these men have caused so much unnecessary suffering in the country. We 
understand that the US Embassy had to deal with these men. But did the embrace have to be so 
fast so public? They are criminals in my view. What the outside world should be doing is giving 
them the message that, yes, other leaders should be allowed to emerge. Why didn’t the US embassy 
also invite religious leaders, elders, women, professionals, when Aideed and Ali Mahdi met, to let 
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these men know that these are the people they have stolen power from? It is a great pity they did 
not think of it. It sent all the wrong signals’ (Kaldor 1999:123). 
 
If the peacemakers on the one hand avoid negotiation with the warlords, they will 
face severe problems such as sabotage. On the other hand, by negotiating with them, the 
peacemakers supply them with a legitimisation to which they are not entitled. This is a 
difficult ethical choice the international community has to face when it decides whether 
or not to negotiate with warlords.  
Another problem has been that the warlords seldom keep to their word in a 
settlement. Repeatedly it has been seen that at the negotiating table the warlords present 
one attitude, but when the implementation phase begins a somewhat different standpoint 
is taken. Many a ceasefire has been signed but not kept, in this way.  
“In sum the faction leaders have demonstrated neither thorough control over territory procedurally 
(election or clan constitution) that they possesses the legitimacy required to reach a settlement on the behalf 
of the Somali people and make it stick. On the contrary, every national peace accord they have ever signed 
has been dead letter” (ICG 2003:16). 
 
Exclusive  and Inc lus ive  Negotiat ions  
The problem on a political level is who to include when doing state-building. The 
problem rather resembles those above: if a warlord is not included in a new political 
framework, he will most likely oppose it, and hinder its efficiency. 
In Liberia the principal problem for ECOMOG was the continuing proliferation 
of factions that made peace attempts increasingly harder. The NPFL refused to recognise 
and cooperate with the IGNU. The country became increasingly split under the rules of 
new warlords, which made for a chaotic scene to control. The factions did not show 
much commitment to the peace process at all. Gradually, ECOWAS had to apply a more 
pragmatic approach, starting with the accords signed in Cotonou 1993 and Akosombo, 
September 1994, when warlords were increasingly dealt with and included in the political 
framework, namely the Liberian National Transitional Government LNTGand the 
Council of State, both of which were established at Cotonou. It was necessary for the 
peacekeepers to take these measures, although it did not solve the issue. The warlords 
still did little to implement the agreements and take part in disarmament and 
demobilisation. Continued distrust and factionalism kept them fighting each other. 
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Hence, warlords tend to oppose any state-building initiative that does not 
inherently empower them. In Somalia as well as in Liberia there are/have been many 
different warlords controlling each their part of the country. When dealing with one 
warlord, his faction is automatically empowered. Therefore the opposing factions will try 
to sabotage the negotiations or its outcome. The same problem is seen in Somalia where 
the current Transitional National Government has not yet been able to return to 
Mogadishu. The warring factions in Somalia oppose a centralised government in which 
they themselves are not represented.  
 
New Wars controlled by warlords are quite difficult to manage. The role the 
warlords play complicates the situation. Warlords are self-sustaining, not paying attention 
to the needs and wishes of others, not even those of the ones they claim to represent. 
This goes financially as well as power-wise. As such, a warlord will seek out the best 
solution for himself. In most cases the stronger one will oppose any international 
attempt to bring peace to the war that enriches him. This can cause mediators and 
intervening actors to empower inferior warlords, directly or indirectly. As the method 
might be effectual, it is also uncertain. It carries with it the risk of helping another 
warlord to repeat the system.  
The problem is most evident at the peace conferences that aim to establish 
governments. Most will agree that the wise thing to do is to establish a government 
founded on the desires and wishes of the population as a whole. Unfortunately, this is 
not always possible, as the warlords are the ones in control of the country.  
In dealing with warlords in New Wars, the international community often chooses 
the lesser of two evils. For the most part, this amounts to dealing with a warlord. The 
approach is highly questionable, though. Unfortunately, it seems that the international 
intervening actors have not yet found a well-designed alternative. 
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Striking a Balance in Peacemaking – Neutrality and 
Impartiality 
 
Another vital aspect of the peacemaking attempts in the New Wars of Liberia and 
Somalia is the effect of the loss of neutrality or impartiality by the third party, the 
mediator who is supposed to bring about a settlement between the warring parties. Sadly, 
in both cases the lesson was rather late in arriving to the intervening actors in question. It 
only happened once both conflicts had seen deadlocks arising between a third party and 
a warring faction, due to the active armed involvement by the former. As this happened, 
the solutions to the conflict were growing ever dimmer and distant. We will examine this 
aspect as well as look into the consequences for peacekeeping if it is carried out without 
the prior consent of all involved parties.    
 
Neutrality – or Having a Stake in the Conflict 
Conflict resolution theories, whether they aim at Old or New Wars, point to 
neutrality as essential for a third party, either as mediator or intervening force. Neutrality 
can be almost impossible to maintain, especially in New Wars, in which the inherent 
zero-sum nature requires a choice of side, and the parties may actually be reluctant to 
support any peace initiative. 
Consequently, neutrality is constantly challenged in New Wars and is contingent 
upon the nature of the mission, the will of the parties as well as the ability of 
peacekeepers to remain neutral. 
The following chapter will focus on the issue of maintaining impartiality in a 
complex war, and whether it is in fact as essential to conflict resolution. 
 
Neutral i t y  or Impart ial i t y? 
There is a widespread opinion that neutrality and impartiality cannot be regarded as 
the same thing. Most agree that impartiality refers to a situation in which the third party 
is indifferent to the gains and losses of either party and, thus, favours neither side. The 
third party then implements the peace agreement without any differentiation (Kaldor 
1999:127-128; Young in Jaye 2003:40). 
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Neutrality refers to the actions of a third party in reaching or trying to reach a 
peace agreement. The effects of the third party’s actions must have no intention to 
terminate the crisis more in favour of one than the other (ibid.). 
Impartiality is an expected and known principle in peacekeeping politics (Aning 
1999b:3), whereas neutrality is more difficult to attain. Impartiality is contingent upon the 
third party not benefiting more from the victory of one over the other.  A multinational 
or combined effort will be more liable to maintain impartiality, or will be impartial at the 
outset even.  In a multinational force more countries with each their interests will have to 
cooperate, and little room will be left for taking sides in the conflict. This is, of course, 
no guarantee of impartiality. 
As discussed above, contemporary conflicts tend to be fuelled by greed and 
grievance and to some degree identity, all leading to a security dilemma. The nature of 
such conflicts is usually zero-sum, making it difficult to reach a solution acceptable to all. 
A zero-sum nature affects the thirds party’s ability to maintain both impartiality and 
neutrality. If such a conflict is to be ended, one party will eventually have to abandon his 
objectives or lose. Therefore the third party will have to support the inferior part more 
than the other, hence loosing impartiality (Aning 1999b).  
When supporting the inferior part in a zero-sum conflict, however, there is a risk 
that force must be used. The instant the third party resorts to coercion, neutrality is lost 
(Kaldor 1999:127-128). By using force the third party inflicts damage on a party in the 
conflict, thereby affecting the outcome in favour of other parties. This is most obvious in 
cases when the peacekeeping force returns fire under attack or retaliates against a certain 
party, as it happened in both Somalia and Liberia.7 This type of event is often interrelated 
with the lack of consent by one or more parties.  
Having outlined some views on impartiality and neutrality, and the problems 
inherent in maintaining these, the consequences of either maintaining or losing these will 
be discussed in the following. 
 
  
Parties of Peacemaking 
It is debatable whether a third party should be entirely without a stake in the 
conflict or not. However, even if the mediator does have a stake in the conflict, he must 
be impartial in the way defined above. Even in the New Wars, with their complexities, 
                                                
7 See below. 
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the mediator, whether local, regional or international, should stay indifferent to the gain 
and losses of the parties, focusing on a way to create positive peace. Failure to do so can 
affect the peace process in a highly negative way. 
 
Command Struc ture  
In peacekeeping, impartiality and neutrality should be inherent in the methods. To 
this end, it is essential that the forces in a multinational peacekeeping force are loyal to 
their command structure. If one contingent acts on its own, it can send the message that 
the force is not united. In turn the peacekeepers can be perceived by the population as 
biased. They are likely not to trust them and will then either try to exploit the bias or 
refuse to cooperate. 
In Somalia, during the hunt for Aideed, subsequent to the incident when the 
Pakistani soldiers were killed at Radio Mogadishu, UNOSOM experienced this kind of 
blurring. While the UN officially had approved the arrest of the ones responsible (in 
effect Aideed’s faction), the Italian contingent negotiated with Aideed. Such an event was 
only one among many taking place during UNOSOM II. Most contingents disagreed on 
the rules of engagement and e.g. reported back to their respective governments before 
carrying out orders given by the UN (Laitin 2001:3-4). 
The result of a non-united effort was that the population started taking sides with 
or against the multinational force. This made handling the warlords more difficult and 
helped dividing the population into supporters and non-supporters, the latter believing 
that the UN wanted to take over administration in Somalia and create a new colony. 
These rumours were encouraged by Aideed’s faction (Prunier 1996: 18) 
The disloyalty was not as apparent in the multinational force in Liberia. Still, the 
contingents perceived the rules of engagement differently and, it seems, reacted 
according to their individual ties with the factions. It must be kept in mind that the 
multinational force in Liberia was also regional, whereas it was international in Somalia. 
Thus, in Liberia, the nations of each contingent could potentially be affected by the 
outcome of the conflict. In some cases, therefore, the forces acted in the interests of 
each their country, Nigeria, a supporter of Doe and a rival of Taylor, was far more 
aggressive towards perpetrators of the peace agreement, as they saw acts of violence as a 
threat to their presence. Ghana and Senegal, on the other hand, hesitated in using force 
(Aning 1999b:15-17).  
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Quandaries in the command structure are, however, not the worst form of 
impartiality.  
 
Part ial  Mediators  in  Somalia 
The Horn of Africa has for many years been and still is an unstable region on the 
continent. The countries of the Horn are marred by both inter- and intra-state conflicts. 
As such, not one country can be regarded as wholly impartial in the Somali conflict. This 
is especially true for Egypt and Ethiopia. As mediators in the conflict, they have proved 
to be very partial indeed.  
In this case it is not a matter of a zero-sum conflict. Rather, the two countries will 
benefit from a certain outcome respectively. It is open to discussion whether a mediator 
should be entirely without stake in the conflict, but in this case Egypt and Ethiopia have 
actively affected the outcome to their own benefit. 
The fall of the dictator Siad Barre threw the country into a stateless chaos. From 
this chaos emerged a number of provinces demanding autonomy. The two most 
significant ones are Puntland and Somaliland (Farah 2002:6). However, neither of these 
has ever been internationally recognised, for which reason they have never been a part of 
the greater UN-controlled peace conferences (Anonymous 2002:250-251).  
However, whether or not they became independent republics was of great 
importance to Egypt and Ethiopia, which was reflected in the conferences of Cairo and 
Sodere. The two countries are engaged in never-ending disputes over control of the 
waters of the Nile (Farah 2002:11). Egypt thus wanted a strong ally. The Cairo 
conference reflected this. The approach adopted at the conference was a top-down 
model, without recognition of Puntland and Somaliland. Had Egypt succeeded, Somalia 
would indeed have become a strong ally in the region. However, Somalia was 
beleaguered by internal war; many different warlords controlled each their area. 
Somaliland had even managed to establish a functional but unrecognised government. It 
seems implausible that a strong state would actually have emerged.  
Ethiopia saw this. What they feared was a centralised but chaotic and unstable 
Somalia. At the time of the Sodere conference they had just ended a bloody war with 
Eritrea, and an uncontrolled Somalia would be prone to host external forces from 
Eritrea. Past relationships between Ethiopia and Somalia were also filled with 
differences. So, at the Sodere conference Ethiopia supported the building-blocks method 
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which recognised autonomous republics. Moreover, Ethiopia has officially recognised 
Somaliland and accepts papers and passports from the region (Farah 2002:11).  
No one can say whether either of these conferences would have achieved positive 
peace, had they succeeded in their efforts. Nonetheless, it stands out that the two 
conferences apparently were not held to the benefit of the suffering peoples of Somalia. 
Rather, they were influenced by issues of security and foreign policy. Neither of the 
mediators could be entirely trusted by all parties to the conflict.  
This is a problem well known to the regional peace conferences on the Somali 
conflict. The countries of the Horn are so interrelated that each of them has an interest 
in a certain outcome. This testifies to the fact that the obvious lack of impartiality and 
neutrality from the regional mediators had a negative effect on the peace process in the 
Somali case. Their objectives were not in consistence with the Somali peoples. 
Impartiality meant that the mediators did not present a solution acceptable to all. 
Another example of the difficulties that the disputes among the mediators caused is the 
conference in Kenya 2002-2004, in which some of the mediating countries refused to sit 
in the same workshop as others (Derlinden and Debiel 2004:19).  
Similar, yet graver, problems regarding impartiality and neutrality occurred in 
Liberia.  
 
Part ial  Mediators  in  Liberia 
As mentioned above, the West African region is historically divided into 
Anglophone and Francophone countries. Among these, the major power is Nigeria, an 
Anglophone country, her main antagonist traditionally being the Francophone Ivory 
Cost. When the Liberian state began falling apart, Nigeria took her hegemonic political 
aspirations to this country, implementing a solo strategy of shoring up the incumbent 
government. This strategy led to regional outcries, especially among the Francophone 
countries, viewing it as an act of regional politics designed to strengthen Nigerian 
control, rather than an altruistic gesture (Draman 2003:29). ECOWAS, as the regional 
organisation through which consensual goals should be achieved, intervened. However, 
even within ECOWAS, Nigeria seemed to be in the lead. Nigeria’s claim to regional 
hegemonic power was de facto recognised as they had the largest stake in Liberia and, 
accordingly, the consequences of the war. Conflict resolution in Africa has shown the 
need for a leading actor, a role which Nigeria was willing to accept. In addition, they gave 
more financial support to the peace process than any other state and even paid for the 
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expenses of other contingents (Aning 1999b:4). The war caused thousands of people to 
flee to the neighbouring countries. Eventually the SMC called for a ceasefire under the 
monitoring auspices of ECOMOG. 
Nigeria put great force into ECOMOG, despite opposition from the Francophone 
countries. Even the ceasefire agreements had a definite imprimatur of Nigeria and her 
identification of Taylor’s NPFL as the main obstacle to peace (Aning 1999b:4; Draman 
2003:29). 
It should be mentioned that not everyone believes that Nigeria was biased because 
of hegemonic regional politics. Conflict researcher Margaret Vogt argues that Nigeria 
accepted the responsibility of guaranteeing peace in West Africa, but of course needed to 
first secure her own borders and citizens living in Liberia (Vogt in Draman 2003:29). 
Not all agree with this altruistic view. It is widely believed that even though, in a 
military intervention, there is a need for a leading country, in the Liberian civil war 
Nigeria took on the responsibility in order to manifest her position in the region, keep 
the Ivory Cost from doing the same and create a stable, friendly-minded Liberia. One 
cannot argue that a quest for peace is ever a fault, but in this case, it seems that the 
impartial actions of Nigeria in the peace process plagued the peace initiatives and the 
efforts of regional political and economic integration (Draman 2003:29-30; Aning 
1999b:4-5). 
The apparent lack of impartiality and neutrality on the part of Nigeria only 
complicated the peace initiatives further. From the outset there was no doubt that 
Nigeria opposed Taylor, even if he did hold more than 90 % of the country. As 
mentioned, ECOMOG only obtained Doe’s consent, never Taylor’s. Their bias gravely 
flawed the peace process as ECOMOG de facto became a party to the conflict, actively 
fighting one faction and thereby affecting the outcome to their own benefit. The 
argument is all the more evident, since ECOWAS was unable to fulfil their mandate and 
the SMC had to restate their request for UN assistance (Aning 1999b: 5). 
 
Nevertheless, Nigeria’s bias was not the only problem. Neither was Ethiopia’s in 
Somalia. In Liberia, when ECOMOG entered as a peacekeeping force, there was no 
actual peace to keep. UNOSOM I faced the same problem in Somalia. In both cases the 
mandates were effectively changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.   
 
 79 
Peace Enforcement  
In its essence peace enforcement is not neutral in the above definition. The very 
need to resort to coercion or violence inflicts damage or losses on the faction exposed to 
the use of force. Thereby the other factions benefit from the activities of the third party, 
effectively compromising the latter’s neutrality and affecting the possible outcome of the 
conflict. The Somalia and Liberian missions were of a peacekeeping nature from the 
outset, but soon turned into peace enforcing. Both forces used their mandate and 
resorted to violence against a specific and troublesome faction, compromising their 
neutrality and aiding the faction opponents. 
 
The Hunt for Aideed  
During the UNOSOM II period in Somalia the multinational force de facto lost its 
neutrality, and, some would say, its impartiality. Overt conflict broke out between 
UNOSOM and Aideed’s SNA forces. It was partly caused by SNA dissatisfaction with 
the change in attitude from UNITAF to UNOSOM and partly by the recognition that 
Aideed along with other warlords had enjoyed during UNITAF. 
The two most powerful warlords in Somalia at the time, Mahdi and Aideed, were 
also the ones competing for Mogadishu. From the outset Mahdi cooperated with the 
multinational force on a larger scale than Aideed did. Mahdi played along and used the 
UN illusion of peace-building to his advantage. Aideed, on the other hand, opposed their 
presence from the very beginning (Prunier 1996:20). Aideed even proclaimed that he 
should be left in charge of the peace process, excluding the international diplomacy. The 
UN refused to pay for his expenses when he held a peace conference, and instead 
arranged their own, failing to invite the SNA representative of the area, warlord Omar 
Jess. Aideed perceived this as a hostile act. Things worsened when a radio loyal to Mahdi 
that same day announced that his supporters and the UN were going to build the Somali 
society together, and that national assets and state institutions should be handed over to 
the UN, this including centres of information. Unfortunately, all this coincided with the 
24 Pakistani troopers being killed by Aideed’s men during an inspection at Radio 
Mogadishu (McDonald 2001:64-65; Prunier 1996:21).  
Analysts disagree on what actually happened that June 5, but the outcome of this 
unfortunate series of events was that the UN Security Council authorised the pursuit and 
arrest of the ones responsible for the attack. In reality the resolution was aimed at Aideed 
and his men. What led to this development was the warlords’ suspicion of the bias of 
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UNOSOM. In effect it did not matter whether they were impartial or not. Mahdi used 
his diplomatic skills to turn Aideed against them. It would be to his benefit if UNOSOM 
was forced to use coercion against the SNA and inflict losses on them (Prunier 1996:21, 
McDonald 2001: 72+79).  
That was exactly what happened. The UN could not just turn the other cheek. Not 
only was the Somali mission at stake, but their credibility in other missions as well. They 
had no choice but to retaliate. The Somalis quickly termed it the “UN War” and 
UNOSOM II became another party alongside the clans, sharing friends and foes with 
them (Prunier 1996:21). 
For some time the UN tried to apprehend Aideed, dead or alive. This included the 
bombing of the “Abdi House” on 12 July. The attack was without warning. In spite of 
UN denials, it is widely believed that the house was not frequented by Aideed at the time, 
but hosted a meeting between traditional elders, who were trying to find a solution to the 
“UN War”. As the apprehension of Aideed had failed, the “UN War” came to a fatal 
culmination 3 October 1993. In consistence with the dysfunctional command structure 
the US contingent launched an attack in the midst of Mogadishu to seize Aideed. The 
fatal decision cost the lives of eighteen US Soldiers and Aideed got away unscathed 
(McDonald 2001:66).  
This fatal de facto loss of neutrality and the perceived bias of the multinational force 
cost the UN its credibility in Somalia. Some researchers suggest that there was in fact no 
change in mandate. UNOSOM II went into the mission with a peace enforcement 
mandate, while the resolution to catch the ones responsible was also a peace 
enforcement mandate. For that reason, it is argued, there was no mission creep, no 
change in circumstances, and no bias. Aideed was the greatest obstacle to peace. He 
openly opposed the multinational forces. Furthermore, he refused to comply with the 
Addis Ababa Agreement of early 1993 which called for a ceasefire and disarmament. In 
order to keep Aideed to the agreement, which he himself had signed, the multinational 
force had no choice but to make use of coercion, precisely what the original UNOSOM 
II mandate requested. Therefore, it was not out of bias that the UN retaliated in such a 
manner. It was, they say, their original mandate (McDonald 2001:63-66).   
 Even so, the parties to the conflict and the population of Somalia saw events 
differently. The fact that the latter thought of the UN as a party to the conflict made 
peace-supporting unfeasible. Whatever the international troops did was seen as an action 
to affect the outcome in their own interest. Eventually, UNOSOM II pulled out. Partly 
 81 
because of the 3 October events, but also because the Somali mission was increasingly 
seen as a lost cause (Prunier 1996:22). The UN could not find the proper way to address 
things, since everything they did was immediately perceived as biased. 
The Somali conflict proves how fatal lack of impartiality and neutrality can be to a 
peacekeeping force. Bearing this in mind, it is no wonder that impartiality is held in such 
high regard as a principle of peacekeeping. Statements from the UN Secretary General 
reflected the need of impartiality even before the second round of the UN forces arrived 
in Somalia. His report from March 1993 emphasises the need to prevent any violent 
action and to monitor all factions (McDonald 2001:74).  
After the European contingents had left Somalia in May 1994, renewed fighting 
was expected. It was believed that once the peacekeeping forces withdrew, Somalia 
would once again explode and the previous level of violence resume. Yet, it did not 
happen. Somalia did not blow up as expected. Violence did not end, but neither was it 
aggravated (Prunier 1996:22). 
The mission was abandoned, partly due to the bias and loss of neutrality of the 
forces, even if one disagrees with the substance of this loss.  Thus, impartiality and 
neutrality was indeed crucial to the mission itself. Still, it cannot be said that it was 
similarly crucial to the overall circumstances. The multinational force could achieve no 
more once impartiality was lost, but what they had already gained was not lost. 
  
Operat ion Octopus 
Nigeria’s position in ECOMOG and their bias against the NPFL caused other 
serious problems in Liberia. The NPFL’s Operation Octopus against the peacekeeping 
force in Monrovia October 1992 was an effect of the contradictions inherent in this 
relationship and partly caused both the extension of the force and the ensuing UN 
intervention.   
At a peace conference in Geneva, the Yamoussoukro peace accord was concluded. 
Through the agreement the Ivory Cost and Senegal were brought into play, which 
balanced the power relations in ECOMOG and reduced the conflict between 
Anglophone and Francophone countries. However, this did not ease the NPFL’s 
suspicion towards ECOMOG. Once the agreement was completed, the NPFL refused to 
comply with disarmament, even though the agreement de facto recognised two 
administrations in Liberia, which strengthened the NPFL (Jaye 2003:159-161). 
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During the ceasefire connected with the peace conference, the NPFL rearmed and 
regrouped. In October 1992, the NPFL used their renewed strength to launch an attack 
on ECOMOG forces in Monrovia, killing both civilians and ECOMOG soldiers. It is 
not clear what compelled them to do so, but the leading explanation is that the attack 
was meant to hassle the peace process and trigger uncertainty in the peacekeeping force 
and the national governments of the contingents, as to whether they should stay in 
Liberia (Jaye 2003:161). This is consistent with the argument that the partiality of a 
dominant mediator can be fatal to a peace process.  
The attack also forced ECOMOG to deviate from neutrality. ECOMOG had to 
cooperate with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), a faction with ties to the interim 
government, to counter the attack. Obviously this compromised the neutrality of the 
peacekeepers, making them an actively fighting party to the conflict (Jaye 2003: 161).  
The results of the Octopus Operation effectively dragged ECOMOG into the war. 
Thereby the initial lack of impartiality caused the loss of neutrality and eventually 
devastated the regional peace initiative. The NPFL’s rather unprovoked attack had the 
world react, and the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to send peacemaking 
forces with a mandate to use coercion to Liberia (Jaye 2003:161). 
The example clearly shows how vital impartiality is to conflict resolution in New 
Wars, and how fatal the lack of it can be.   
 
Consent 
Peacekeeping stipulates consent. In order to keep a peace, there must be a peace to 
keep, and as such the parties must agree to the presence and authority of the 
peacekeepers. Peacekeeping is in effect the antithesis of peace enforcement. 
Peacekeeping is constrained by narrow rules, whereas peace enforcement procedures are 
directed at engagement in the conflict, often at the risk of compromising their neutrality. 
Consent is a means to overcome the risk of having to resort to coercion, thus, remaining 
neutral (Aning 1999b:3). In a collapsed or failed state, however, it is immensely difficult 
to decide whose consent is critical. This is a feature of the complexities of the New Wars 
and the inherent difficulties that they present today’s peacekeepers with. 
In most cases one would say that consent of the official authorities is the most 
critical to obtain. An international mediator achieves legality through the request of local 
authorities. Contentions occur, though, if the state is a failed one, and the inviting 
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authority has no national recognition. This was the case in both Somalia and Liberia. 
Whose consent, then, should the mediators achieve?  
The UN in Somalia and ECOWAS in Liberia sought consent in a milieu of 
factions and factional groups. The myriad of actors in these conflicts disturbed the 
organisations in their decision-making, as to whose consent to seek. It was, as 
mentioned, critical to the success and credibility of the missions and to the factions’ 
perception of the forces impartiality (Aning 1999b:8).  
To this end the consent of all parties to the conflict must be achieved, which is not 
always the case. Neither in Somalia nor Liberia did all parties consent. If one or more 
parties do not consent, neutrality is difficult, nigh impossible, to maintain. There is a 
great risk, then, that the peacekeeping forces will experience actual peace enforcement or 
that the mandate as a whole is changed to peace enforcement, as it happened in Liberia 
only a month after the arrival of ECOMOG in August 1990. ECOWAS soon realised 
that a peacekeeping mandate demands that there is a peace to keep, hence, the mandate 
was changed. It reflected the situation in the ground (Draman, Cartman 2003:15). In 
Somalia the first UN mission, UNOSOM I, was a peacekeeping mission. The following 
UN mission under command of US troops, UNITAF, was mandated with a combined 
language of chapter VI and VII in the UN charter, i.e. peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement respectively. UNOSOM II arriving in 1993 was the first UN mission ever 
to be mandated under chapter VII alone, authorising the troops to use force if necessary 
in order to keep the factions to the peace agreement signed earlier that year (McDonald 
2001:63-64; United Nations Security Resolution 814). As we have already seen, both 
ECOMOG and UNOSOM II compromised their neutrality by using enforcement 
powers, and thus jeopardised the success of their missions. 
What can happen is that factions not agreeing to the presence of multinational 
forces will see them as an illegitimate invasion force and address them accordingly 
(Lillienskjold 1998:45), as it happened with Aideed in Somalia and the Operation 
Octopus in Liberia. In addition, a faction that only forcibly accepts the authority of the 
peacekeeping force is likely to exploit the ceasefire period to rearm and regroup, as the 
NPFL had done prior to Octopus (Jaye 2003:268). Consent can also be dissimulated the 
way Mahdi did this in Somalia. Pretending to wish for a peaceful solution will achieve the 
sympathy of a peacekeeping force, and in doing so, turn the same force against potential 
rivals (Lillienskjold 1998:45). 
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Hence, consent is crucial to impartiality and, thus, to peacekeeping. Without 
consent of all parties to the conflict, peace enforcement is inevitable, and the force will 
compromise neutrality. In mediating in the New Wars, the peacekeeping forces must 
recognise the critical nature of consent, but also the difficulties of achieving it in a 
conflict which some parties have no desire to end. Similarly, the number of actors in a 
conflict is vital to recognise. The mediator in a New War cannot just rely on the 
internationally recognised authority, as it may not have national legitimacy. 
 
Consent and Cooperat ion  in  Somalia 
Already from the outset the UN nearly compromised their impartiality in Somalia. 
On the preliminary mission in January 1992 the UN envoy James Jonah refrained from 
meeting other factions than Mahdi’s. Meeting only with one out of several warlords 
turned out, not surprisingly, to be a poor way of attaining consent from all parties. The 
rest of the de facto leaders of Somalia, including General Aideed, accordingly declined to 
acquiesce to the deployment of UN forces, even if their presence was meant only to 
secure the delivery of aid to the needy (Aning 1999b:9).  
This fatal error caused the UN to intervene with peacekeeping forces without 
consent and without a peace to keep. UNOSOM I was unable to carry out their mission, 
and for this reason UNITAF was created. UNOSOM had lacked the strength to deal 
with the powerful warlords, who in reality decided when and where UNOSOM could go 
and to whom they could deliver aid. UNITAF was under US command and, thus, had a 
great deal more fire power. They were, however, not inclined to use it (McDonald 
2001:57). UNITAF was determined to perform its mission without having to resort to 
force. To achieve that objective UNITAF cooperated with the warlords in each region. 
They achieved their acceptance to deliver aid without hindrance. In the process, 
however, they de facto recognised the warlords’ authority (Prunier 1996:119). 
Once UNOSOM II took over under a new, more powerful mandate, the attitude 
towards the warlords changed. While UNITAF had negotiated with them, UNOSOM II 
had no choice but to oppose the warlords. Such was their mandate (MacDonald 2001:63-
64). The warlords who had never really accepted the presence of the multinational force 
and its authority turned on it. Aideed’s faction, the SNA, for one, decided to test the 
strength of UNOSOM II and did so on 5 June, killing the aforementioned Pakistani 
soldiers.  
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Entering without the consent of all, and then later on negotiating with warlords, 
who had no intention of ending the war, greatly disturbed the UN’s possibilities in 
Somalia. Their policy was perceived as inconsistent, and none of the warlords actually 
trusted them. The UN had no credibility as a result of the lack of consent, impartiality 
and neutrality. Thus, they became a party to the conflict 
 
Doe or Taylor? 
A similar error occurred in Liberia. When ECOWAS decided to intervene in civil 
strife, President Samuel Doe willingly invited them. Before sending ECOMOG to 
accommodate this invitation, ECOWAS unfortunately failed to determine the reach of 
Doe’s authority and to achieve the consent of Charles Taylor who in effect controlled 
90% of the Liberian territory. Taylor opposed the peacekeeping force which he viewed 
as depriving the NPFL of their battlefield successes (Aning 1999b:8-9). 
Taylor considered the deployment of the multinational force as an invasion, and 
therefore liable to be attacked. In accordance with the presentation of the problem of 
consent, ECOMOG became a party to the conflict, as they were not accepted by all 
parties, in this case not even by the most powerful part. ECOWAS did not recognise that 
the consent of the state was not enough, they needed the consent of the quasi-state as 
well (Aning 1999b:9).  
As ECOWAS had not accomplished consent, ECOMOG was perceived as biased 
even before their arrival in Liberia. The mandate quickly transformed into peace 
enforcement, and the already partial force lost its neutrality. ECOMOG’s situation made 
it impossible to perform their task, and the mandate was not fulfilled. In order to create 
peace and disarm the warring factions, ECOWAS was forced to ask the UN for 
assistance, believing that the larger organisation could in fact remain impartial and neutral 
and therefore support the ECOWAS authority (Aning 1999b:10). 
 
Both in Somalia and Liberia the lack of consent became vital to the impartiality of 
the missions. Neither organisation recognised the need to define all parties to the conflict 
and get their consent. In New Wars, the authority of a third party is not inherent in its 
position. Consent is vital. New Wars consists of many parties, and not all wish to end the 
conflict. If the mediator fails to recognise this and acts accordingly, as it would seem 
happened in Somalia and Liberia, peacemaking becomes an insurmountable chore.    
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Outsider Impartiality or Insider Partiality? 
It has been assumed for many years that mediators of civil strife must be impartial. 
Indeed, the discussion of this chapter points to this. In recent years, this assumption has 
been contested by some researchers. It has been suggested that the “insider-partial” 
mediator is more likely to be successful than is the “outsider-impartial”. Insider-partial 
refers to a regional or local mediator. The mediator must live within the conflict area and 
thus have a partiality with regard to how the conflict should preferably end. The 
outsider-impartial mediator is not from the area or employed by an international 
organisation like the UN. In such cases the mediator is not directly affected by the 
outcome of the conflict (Olson, Pearson 2002:421). 
What is argued is that a mediator from the region will be forced to live with its 
own work post-mediation. This resembles the very nature of intra-conflict, in which the 
parties cannot go elsewhere once the conflict has ended, as the parties to a sub-national 
conflict can. The very fact that the mediator has a personal interest in the attainment of 
positive peace should compel the warring parties to trust the mediator (Olson, Pearson 
2002:423). Intra-conflicts in fragile regions have the potential to destabilise the whole 
region. This is especially true in the African continent where whole regions are affected 
by one conflict, and where contagion is very real, starting with flows of refugees or even 
cross-borders attacks. Thus, the insider-partial mediator is indeed partial, since the war 
affects the mediator himself (Olson, Pearson 2002:425).  
The theory of proximity as a deciding factor originally evolved in Latin-American 
conflicts, but has been tried on conflicts all over the world. In our two cases, however, 
the question of proximity does not seem to have relevance regarding the success of 
conflict resolution. Rightfully, it should be said that the theory points to proximity as 
related to trust, and therefore success (Olson, Pearson 2002). 
Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberian peace process does not seem to have 
enhanced the chances of positive peace. On the contrary, Nigerian engagement caused 
the parties not to trust ECOMOG. Nigeria was interested in ending the conflict, but 
their partiality went beyond ending the conflict. As described, their aim was to affect the 
outcome of the conflict in such a way that they could maintain their position as major 
regional power. Even had their objective been altruistic, their partiality in the conflict as 
perceived by the parties was fatal to the mission. Subsequently, as already shown above, 
they asked the UN for help, thus turning to the outsider-neutral. 
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While the UN had been a somewhat stabilising power in Liberia, their presence did 
not help the situation in Somalia. Despite the attempts to maintain impartiality, the 
credibility of the international organisation faded in the eyes of the population and the 
parties to the conflict. It did, however, not happen because the UN came as an outsider-
impartial. Instead their involvement in the conflict and the perception of the troops as a 
party caused the population not to trust them. As we know, the UN pulled out, and it 
took a number of attempts before the regional mediators succeeded to some extend. The 
Kenya conference held by IGAD 2002-2004 was the final attempt at which today’s 
government was established. 
Our cases thus both support and challenge the theory of proximity. Accordingly, 
research has shown that what causes success, even if not complete, are renewed 
attempts, presence of military at some point to force the parties to the table, and, indeed, 
the ripeness of the moment (Olson, Pearson 2002:440-441). The major organisations 
have the military power to force a negative peace through. But ultimately, what it comes 
down to, is trust. Regardless of the motives, conflict resolution only works if the warring 
parties trust the mediator. If they do not have this belief, neither factions wishing for 
peace nor warlords presented with a rational choice will comply with the conflict 
resolution attempt. In this perspective, credibility, not impartiality, is what is crucial to 
peacemakers in New Wars.   
 
  
The essence of the impartiality discussion above is that credibility must be 
maintained at all times if a peace initiative is to be successful. In New Wars, the problem 
arises that not all will benefit from peace. Therefore consent must be obtained from all 
parties for the third party to be conceived as impartial and credible.  
In accordance with the discussion of this chapter, we argue that the origin of the 
third party is of no significance. The relative success of peace processes in Liberia and 
Somalia has not been contingent upon whether the third party was regional or 
international. The key factor was that the need of impartiality and credibility was 
accepted and applied to the initiative. Though, the whole notion of neutrality must be 
qualified by the obligation or desire to engage in humanitarian disasters. Where peace 
enforcement is unavoidable, the initial aim might be to ease the suffering of a population, 
and only after this, will the establishment of peace follow.  
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By the end of our examination period, both countries had achieved a degree of 
success in their peace processes, even if it is doubtful today whether the success is 
lasting. However, the many failed initiatives show great difficulty in dealing with conflicts 
within the frame of New Wars. Our cases have shown that the inability to retain 
credibility in the eyes of all parties to the conflict has had severe impact on the relative 
failure of the peace initiatives. The lack of credibility on the part of a third party does not 
worsen the situation, but neither does it enhance chances of peace.  
Third parties in the New Wars of today have had difficulties in applying 
impartiality and neutrality. The complex nature of the actors and their aims has fatally 
hindered this. Warlords, who deliberately prolong the war, attack the peacemaking forces 
and exploit the presence of multinational forces and the deliverance of humanitarian aid 
to their own advantage, proved too great a challenge, one which both the UN and the 
regional organisations have dealt with in a rather debatable manner at best.  
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Lessons Learned from the Peace Support of the 1990s  
 
It is always easy for outsiders to point out the errors of others. Undoubtedly, as it 
should be clear by now, the New Wars presented here posed an altogether new challenge 
to the peacekeeping actors of the international community, what with the imploded 
states, the proliferation of warlord regimes, the raging war economy and the 
neighbouring countries each seeking their own fortunes. Thus, both the UN forces in 
Somalia and Liberia and the regional organisation, ECOWAS, had their hands full and 
followed paths that were fraught with misjudgements. However, we shall not end this 
assessment, if you will, without giving due space to the appraisals of the involved 
peacemaking organs themselves.  
 
From Traditional Peacekeeping to Multidimensional Peacekeeping   
United Nations peacekeeping has evolved since the end of the Cold War. As 
already mentioned, traditional peacekeeping was a means to resolve conflicts between 
nation states by the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from 
various countries under the command of the UN.  An ordinary UN peacekeeping task 
was to monitor a ceasefire between warring factions, when they had given the 
peacekeepers their consent to enter. In doing this the conflict would be addressed with 
diplomatic efforts (United Nations 2004:1).          
 
In the spirit of cooperation the UN Security Council gradually established larger 
and often more complex UN missions which involved assisting in the implementation of 
more comprehensive peace agreements in intra-state conflicts. Some peacekeeping 
efforts were successful, as in Mozambique, while others failed, as the mission in Somalia 
did. On the subject of the latter, the UN explains: ‘Some efforts failed, perhaps as the result of 
an overly optimistic assessment of what UN peacekeeping mission could accomplish’ (United Nations 
2004: 2). When peacekeepers were sent to conflict zones in Somalia, neither a ceasefire 
nor the consent of all parties had been secured. According to the UN, the mission failure 
was due to a lack of manpower and political will to implement its mandates. The failed 
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia has led to a self-
examination by the UN (United Nations  2004:ibid). 
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In 1991, based on the newly found complexities of the conflicts, the Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, decided that a reform of UN peacekeeping was in order. He 
undertook a thorough assessment of events leading to the fall of Srebrenica and 
commissioned an investigation of UN actions during the genocide in Rwanda 1994. 
These assessments highlighted that the UN peacekeeping operations needed to have 
clear rules of engagements and better coordination between the Secretariat in New York 
and the UN agencies planning the deployment of the missions. It was further 
emphasised that there was a need to improve cooperation between the UN and regional 
actors. Finally, the UN needed to further protect civilians in conflicts (United Nations 
2006a:1). 
But around the same time, UN intervention was expanded to include issues such as 
rule of law, civil administration, economic development and human rights. This led the 
Secretary-General to ask his long-time adviser Lakdar Brahimi to examine and identify 
weaknesses in UN peace operations and suggest improvements. The report from 2000, 
known as the Brahimi Report, suggested clear and specific mandates as well as consent 
to the operation by the parties involved in the conflicts. Furthermore, successful 
peacekeeping would require adequate resources to implement mandates effectively and 
to deter potential spoilers (United Nations 2006a:2). 
 
Lessons Learned  
 The response of the United Nations to the conflicts of Liberia and Somalia has 
been far-reaching. The intervention in the two conflicts has involved peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building. The experience learned in these 
interventions has proved to be important lessons for the international community in 
fashioning policies and instruments for future conflict intervention involving failed and 
collapsed states. The failure in Somalia can, according to the UN, be explained by the 
resistance from warring factions. They were not interested in committing themselves to 
peace and cooperation with the UN and its agencies. As a result the UN withdrew its 
forces in March 1995 while ‘highlighting, as never before, the limits to the international community’s 
ability to sustain indefinitely its support of costly peace-enforcement operation’ (United Nations 
1996:3).      
UN has learned that under-resourced and under-sized peacekeeping operations in 
the 1990s have proven ill-suited for the contemporary conflicts, i.e. New Wars. Somalia 
proved that weak and muddled mandates could neither prevent rogue political factions 
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nor contain the well-armed gangs that arise out of a power and legitimacy vacuum 
(Brahimi Report 2000:49). Not only have these factions been targeting and abusing 
civilians, they have also attacked the UN peacekeepers. Thus, in conflicts where there is 
no peace to keep the Security Council needs to provide more robust mandates based on 
Chapter VII. This involves the “use of all necessary means” on the subject of 
peacemaking. In Somalia, to begin with there was no peace enforcement mandate, 
whereas in Liberia there is a Chapter VII mandate. As a result, the international 
community began using more apt mandates for robust operations like the one in Liberia 
from 2003, UNMIL, which allowed the peacekeepers to act with a more profound 
response to the conflict (Brahimi Report 2000:16-17). 
Furthermore, the Brahimi Report has recommended that the UN as part of the 
new operations focus on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. It is thus crucial 
that the UN is funding reintegration and demobilisation of fighters in order to help them 
find productive work. This has been emphasised in recent endeavours in Liberia 
(Brahimi Report 2000:17). This is a lesson that the international community has learned 
from conflicts such as the one in Somalia.  In collapsed states, conflict constituencies 
with an interest in continuing instability, communal tension and a predatory economy 
usually exist. UNOSOM II faced these problems with a marginalisation of certain 
warlords, which entailed the risk of violent backlashes. The transition problems from 
UNITAF to UNOSOM II proved that there had not been enough attention on 
disarming warlords and reintegration of these in legal matters. Hence, UNOSOM II 
faced violent backlashes, which in the end forced the international community to 
withdraw.        
The UN also experienced that the timeframe for peacekeeping missions needed to 
be extended. In the 1990s, the missions tended to end as soon as a new government was 
installed. This proved to be short-termed solutions as sustainable peace is a long-term 
process. Thus, other aims should be achieved before peacekeepers should withdraw 
(United Nations 2006a:5). This is the case in Liberia where peacekeepers are still present 
even though peace has been established and a new government installed. Real peace 
takes time; building national capacity takes time; rebuilding trust takes time (United 
Nations 2004:5). Furthermore, the UN has learned that rule of law is a critical part of 
mission planning.  
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Mult inat ional and Regional Cooperat ion  
From the beginning of the 1990s, UN peacekeeping has increasingly engaged in 
partnerships with regional organisations. The first co-located operation was established 
with ECOWAS in Liberia 1993. In 2003 ECOMOG forces paved the way for the 
deployment of United Nations troops. These cooperative arrangements with regional 
actors have improved the outcome of the UN efforts to end conflicts (United Nations 
2004:11). But, with the transitions from a regional or multinational to a UN 
peacekeeping force some common problems have emerged. The lack of equivalency 
between forces in peacekeeping transition context; the lack of basic logistic requirements; 
differences in force mandates; and capability gaps have all proved to be major obstacles 
(United Nations 2005a:2). Having assessed some of the lessons learned by the UN 
during the interventions of the 1990s, let us now turn our attention to the lessons learned 
by ECOWAS in West African conflicts.   
The lessons learned from the ECOMOG intervention are of a very positive nature. 
According to this institution, its objectives of regional intervention have been to secure 
ceasefires and create conducive environments for negotiations. The assessments of 
ECOMOG´s intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone etc. conclude that the interventions 
have been successful. They have forced armed factions to accept negotiations, which for 
the most part have led to ceasefires. The institution acknowledges that there has been 
some problems and difficulties attached to its prior peace efforts in West African 
countries. One obstacle has been that in Liberia it did not secure the cooperation of all 
armed parties prior to the intervention. In particular, the NPFL, ruled by Charles Taylor, 
strongly opposed ECOMOG. This resulted in a pendulum swing between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. However, ECOWAS explains its intervention by stating that the 
option was between an intervention or allowing the population of Monrovia either to be 
massacred or to die of starvation and disease (Khobe No. 44 2000). Nevertheless, 
ECOWAS declares that it has transformed the intervention successfully from peace 
enforcement to peacekeeping in cases like Liberia.  
However, actors within ECOMOG have retrospectively identified a number of 
problems experienced in its own interventions. What has complicated intervention the 
most has been the difficulties in the setting up of a unified command. This has arisen 
from distrust among member states and the influence of non-regional powers (Khobe 
No 44 2000). Furthermore, there has been a tendency of excessive control by home 
governments; lack of the right equipment, arms and ammunition; poor sea and airlift 
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capabilities and finally poor coordination and liaisons with international relief agencies. 
But, despite these problems, ECOWAS concludes that the institution is a reminder of 
the fact that the right tool for conflict resolution can be found within the continent. This 
is possible if, and only if, the African countries are prepared to pool their resources. The 
most important lesson learned by ECOMOG is that there is no need to wait for outside 
help to Africa. The continent itself can address its problems effectively (Khobe No. 44 
2000). 
   
UN Status of the Liberian and Somali Conflicts 
According to the United Nations, the status of the two conflicts in 2006 is as 
follows: 
Liberia is on the brink of transformation into a fledging democracy. 2006 will 
challenge the newly elected government of Liberia to deliver its promises. In addition, 
this year will challenge the international community to ensure the necessary support for a 
successful transformation. This is done with the help of the 15,000 UNMIL 
peacekeepers who have brought stability to Liberia. The October 2005 presidential 
election is a move towards long-term stability, self-sufficiency and sustainability. 
Furthermore, as a sort of closure to the war, Charles Taylor has recently been handed 
over to an UN-backed war crime tribunal and is in the process of being tried for alleged 
war crimes (United Nations 2005b) 
Somalia on the other hand is experiencing the consequences of a new drought, the 
worst in ten years. The situation is of particular concern because of fifteen years of 
armed conflict, the widespread human rights abuse, the destruction of public 
infrastructure, and the disintegration of basic health and social services. The 2005 rain 
season failed resulting in the already trying live conditions getting worse. Nevertheless, 
the UN mentions that it has seen encouraging developments towards improvement in 
the humanitarian areas. This is concluded because various reconciliation initiatives have 
taken place among clans around in the drought-affected areas (United Nations 2006b)  
All the same, no peace exists in Somalia, and the international community still has many 
qualms about entering this country. Somalia might still have a long way to go.             
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The Key Difficulties of Conflict Resolution  
We have now discussed a number of the difficulties that arose for the intervening 
forces and mediators in two conflicts within the framework of New Wars. The preceding 
theoretical presentation has explained the level of complexity in New Wars presented in 
the cases. Their solutions are equally complex which, of course, partly is the reason for 
the difficulties encountered by the international community in Somalia and Liberia. The 
examination has been focused on the main questions: 
 
How are  the ac tors  engaged in  con f l i c t int erven tion  coping wi th the  complexi ty o f 
New Wars? 
- How can we unders tand the  re ciprocal  re lat ionship be tween warlord regimes  and 
con f l i ct  in t ervent ion i st s? 
- How are  the complexi t i es  o f  neutral i t y  af fe c t ing the  thi rd part i e s´  poss ibi l i ti e s 
o f  con f l ic t  reso lu tion? 
 
The aim is not to advise on the better solution, but rather to reveal the endeavours 
and their problems.  
 
Summing Up the Analysis 
In the beginning of the 1990s, when the first attempts to calm the situations in 
Somalia and Liberia were being made, the international community8 as a whole had only 
little experience in handling the kind of civil strife seen in these countries. The 
inexperience caused a lot of early errors. New Wars, like the Somali and Liberian, are 
particularly complicated by the number of actors and their means, and by the violent 
warfare adopted by the parties. 
The inexperience of the intervening actors and mediators in the Somali and 
Liberian conflicts turned out to be fatal for the ability to handle such conflicts. The 
violent nature of the conflicts was not countered until after the interventions had started. 
The forces were too weak from the beginning, and were only reinforced later. This also 
has to do with the misinterpretation that the warring parties were interested in achieving 
peace and reconciliation. Thus, the complexity caused by greed, warlords and violence 
                                                
8 The international community here refers to every country or organisation directly or indirectly involved in 
the conflict management. 
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was neither acknowledged prior to the intervention, nor prior to the peace conferences 
of the Somali civil war.  
Had the intervening actors and mediators understood these complexities or even 
encountered them before, it is not unlikely that the approach and the outcome would 
have been different. As evidence of this argument serves the fact that UNOSOM in 
Somalia was actually reinforced once the problems had been recognised. Likewise, in 
Liberia, ECOMOG did not request the assistance of the UN until after the peace process 
had gone wrong. The subsequent cooperation, however fumbling it was, since the UN 
had never cooperated with a regional force, did have an impact on the relative success 
achieved after the UN arrival. With regard to the conferences, it is evident that prior 
experience promoted their chances of success, as it has happened with the Kenya 
conference on Somali reconciliation.  
Inexperience is just one matter. Warlords in African conflicts can be said to be a 
primary concern. Dealing with warlords is confused by inexperience, no doubt. But the 
need for experience stems from their immensely complicating position in New Wars, 
particularly in the African ones.  
The warlords’ rationale of greed compels them to keep the war going. As shown, 
their business success in often contingent upon the war itself, as they benefit from 
privatisation of security, banana tariffs, illicit diamonds and a myriad of other dubious 
business ventures. They have no desire to end the war since they are in a zero-sum game. 
In addition, they have claimed power in illegitimate ways. The situation for the 
international community is intolerable. Since the warlords hold actual power they cannot 
be excluded from the negotiations, but at the same time, they have no wish but to exploit 
the peace process, even destroy it, if that is more beneficial. 
The international community is thus forced to cooperate with the warlords. In that 
way the authority and political power of the warlords are indirectly recognised. At the 
same time, they are responsible for killings and suffering. Nevertheless, the international 
community has no choice but to make the situation one of a positive sum. To do this, 
they can support the inferior warlord, e.g. through sanctions or actual force. It works, as 
shown above, but it is a short-term solution. It is a choice of the lesser of two evils, until 
the international community can find a better alternative. So far, as we have seen in our 
two cases, the international community has either ignored the warlords, causing the latter 
to do as they please, fought them, thus becoming a party to the conflict, or negotiated 
with them, to the disadvantage of the people they claim to represent and to the rest of 
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the mission, as it happened with UNOSOM II who suffered from the warlords’ feeling 
of superiority after the UNITAF venture.      
Adding to the difficulties of handling New Wars, is the question of maintaining 
neutrality. The examination has shown a definite need to be impartial and neutral in a 
peacekeeping mission. However, the point is not so much whether the third party has a 
stake in the conflict, but whether credibility can be sustained. Credibility is that which 
can cause the parties to comply. This, in turn, is complicated by the violent nature of 
New Wars. In the name of humanity the international community can be left with no 
choice but to intervene. In these cases consent, vital to credibility, can seldom be 
obtained from all parties, especially not the stronger warlord with the upper hand in the 
conflict.  
The novelty of New Wars has indeed had an impact on the intervening actors’ 
ability to cope with the problem of credibility and peace enforcement. While 
conventional wars have offered the third party an inherent authority and credibility, the 
New Wars has, instead, robbed the intervening actor of the same. Due to the actors’ 
aims and mode of warfare, whatever the third party does can be seen as less than neutral, 
a factor that is reinforced by the zero-sum nature of the conflict. The international 
community has continuously been made a party to the conflict, thus having to change its 
method by either pulling the mission out of the conflict or dragging other organisations 
in. 
 
The Essence  
One issue cannot be regarded as more crucial to the outcome of the international 
community’s efforts than any other. The attempts show that the intervening actors and 
mediators learned as they went along, which over time made their initiatives more 
effectual. One can say that the prolongation of the conflicts could have been avoided, 
but the needed experience in resolution of New Wars simply did not exist at the time. 
This factor indeed complicated the international community’s interventions. In this 
regard, it should be recognised that it is the complexity of the New Wars in the global 
society that demanded such experience. 
The position of the warlords in the conflicts is a central factor in the New Wars. It 
is their rationale and their mode of warfare which for the most part complicates the 
contemporary conflict. Their greed is what compels them to keep fighting. The very aim, 
self-proliferation and profit, is also what fuels and drives the war. When the aim, the war 
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economy and the mode of warfare are all interdependent and unacceptable to the masses 
of world society, while at the same time the actors are crucial to achieving peace, an 
apparent paradox arises. Thus it is all the dynamics of the New Wars put together that 
are the complicating factors as well.  
To achieve negative peace, eliminating the violent behaviour, it is imperative to 
understand these dynamics. This comprehension, though, has to be connected to 
another factor of the conflicts. Both Somalia and Liberia are at best failed states and thus 
in reality stateless. In regard to New Wars this means that not only are there numerous 
actors in the conflict, but none of them can in fact be regarded as legitimate. The 
invitation that peacekeeping missions rely on cannot be issued with the required 
authority. 
In the end, one can ask whether the international community did at first cope with 
the complexities presented throughout this examination at all. Much point to the fact 
that the inexperience caused the international community to underestimate the 
consequences the warlords’ positions could have, as well as those of negotiating with 
them. Furthermore, the failure to see through the complexities crippled the international 
community’s ability to remain neutral, as did the violent nature of the conflicts and the 
warlords’ perception of war and peace. Neither the issue of the complexity, the warlords 
nor the question of neutrality was given the needed attention prior to the interventions in 
Somalia and Liberia. Only as time went on did the difficulties become clear to the 
intervening actors, thus changing their methods. 
If this has caused a basic change of method within the international community 
shall be left untouched here, as shall the final evaluation of successes and failures. What 
shall be said, however, is that the difficulties encountered with regard to New Wars 
ought to raise questions and considerations among those involved in conflict resolution, 
when it comes to their handling of such complex situations. 
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